IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

CASE NO: 502015CA000086XXXXMB AA

MAR-A-LAGO CLUB, L.L.C., a
Delaware limited liability corporation,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA, a political subdivision under the law of the State of Florida and BRUCE PELLY, individually,

Defendants.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

THE HONORABLE RICHARD L. OFTEDAL

DATE: October 2, 2015

TIME: 8:59 a.m. - 10:08 a.m.

1	
2	APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF:
3	
4	SELLARS, MARION & BACHI, P.A. BY: JOHN M. MARION, IV ESQUIRE and JEREMY D. BERTSCH, ESQUIRE
5	811 North Olive Avenue
6	West Palm Beach, Florida, 33401
7	LAW OFFICES OF BRUCE ROGOW BY: BRUCE S. ROGOW, ESQUIRE
8	500 E. Broward Boulevard, Suite 1930 Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 33394
9	,,,
10	APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT:
11	OFFICE OF THE COUNTY ATTORNEY
12	BY: AMY PETRICK, ESQUIRE
13	300 North Dixie Highway, Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida, 33401
14	KAPLAN, KIRSCH, ROCKWELL
15	BY: W. ERIC PILSK, ESQUIRE 1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 800
16	Washington, D.C. 20036
17	
18	BE IT REMEMBERED, that the following
19	proceedings were taken in the above-styled cause Before
20	Honorable Richard Oftedal at the Palm Beach County
21	Courthouse, 205 N. Dixie Highway, Room 10-B in the City of
22	West Palm Beach, County of Palm Beach, State of Florida on
23	the 2nd of October, 2015, to wit:
24	
25	THE COURT: Okay. So we're all here on Mar-A-Largo

1 and Palm Beach County, correct? MS. PETRICK: Correct. MR. ROGOW: Yes. 3 THE COURT: First order of business, I will just have everybody make their appearances for the record, 5 please. 6 7 MR. ROGOW: For the Plaintiffs, Bruce Rogow, John Marion and Jeremy Bertsch. 8 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. PILSK: And for the Defendant, Eric Pilsk and 10 11 Amy Petrick. THE COURT: Thank you. I will tell you all that I 12 think that I have done my homework. It was a lot of 13 reading material, but I think that I read through it all 14 as well as some case law that you cited. 15 16 I think I'm pretty much up to speed as to what the 17 issues are, so don't feel that you need to repeat everything that you have written. I believe this is the 18 County's motion, so why don't you proceed. 19 Thank you, Your Honor. 20 MR. PILSK: As you say, we're here on the County and Mr. Pelly's 21 22 motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. plaintiff has alleged claims in general that it's been 23 injured by aircraft flying over Mar-A-Largo. 24 It pleads claims of public nuisance, trespass, inverse condemnation 25

and breach of contract, and also seeks injunctive remedy
for the nuisance and trespass claims.

Under the guise of these claims, the plaintiff seeks to redesign the departure procedures of Palm Beach

International Airport, to minimize noise impacts upon its property, and seeks to enrich itself \$100 million in damages.

In order to justify this relief, plaintiff makes the outrageous and absolutely false claim that the airport director is using undue influence to compel FAA air traffic controllers to direct aircraft -- to deviate aircraft from the normal departure procedures and fly directly over Mar-A-Largo in a personal attack on plaintiff's principal, Mr. Trump.

These claims are frankly ridiculous and simply designed to harass the County and Mr. Pelly. For the record, we vehemently deny these allegations. We'll state for the record that FAA traffic controllers alone control the airport departing and arriving at the airport pursuant to long-standing procedures and the airport director cannot and does not influence those procedures at all.

On a motion to dismiss however, we don't need to resolve that issue. The fact is that none of plaintiff's claims survive legal scrutiny even at the pleadings

1 stage.

Most of the claims -- all of the clams are asserted
against both defendants, so to try to break this up in a
more efficient way, what I would like to do first is
address the two claims where each of the defendants have
slightly different responses.

Those are the inverse condemnation and the breach of contract claim, and then I'll come back and deal with the claims where the responses are in common.

First on behalf of Mr. Pelly, the law is clear and plaintiffs don't dispute that there is no inverse condemnation claim against an individual. Employees, even of states and state agencies, do not have the power of eminent domain.

Accordingly, the claim for inverse condemnation against Mr. Pelly simply can't stand as a matter of law and that should be dismissed. Frankly dismiss it with prejudice because there is simply no way to assert that claim against an individual.

On the breach of contract claim against Mr. Pelly, the claim -- excuse me, the claim alleges a breach of contract for failure to achieve maximum adherence to the preferred flight tracks, and that is in the amended complaint in Paragraph 85.

The plain terms of the settlement agreement

1 demonstrate that Mr. Pelly was not required to achieve 2 maximum adherence to the flight tracks or was he prohibited from doing anything regarding the flight 3 tracks. The language about the maximum adherence is in 5 Paragraph 10 of the amended complaint, and that's 6 7 attached as Exhibit A to the amended complaint. I have a copy if Your Honor would like to follow along. 8 THE COURT: I'm good. Go ahead. MR. PILSK: Okay. Thank you. 10 Paragraph 10 of the settlement agreement starts by 11 acknowledge that the County has always taken the position 12 that it has no authority. Both parties acknowledge that 13 the County's position is that the County has no authority 14 or capability to enforce the flight procedures, and that 15 adherence to an enforcement of said procedures is the 16 17 legal obligation solely of the FAA and the airlines operating aircraft at PBIA. 18 Paragraph 10 then goes on to provide in an effort 19 to attempt to encourage the greatest adherence possible 20 to those flight procedures, the County shall take certain 21 22 actions. Then it specifies three specific actions that the 23 County must undertake which are basically reporting 24 requirements, two of which expired years ago. 25

1	THE COURT: Mr. Pelly was a signatory to the
2	settlement agreement, right?
3	MR. PILSK: He was a signatory to the settlement
4	agreement, but the obligations they allege here do not go
5	to Mr. Pelly, they're obligations of the County.
6	In fact, the only allegation of Mr. Pelly was to
7	sign the release documents, which he did, and there is no
8	obligation to the contrary.
9	The specific claim of breach they allege simply does
10	not go against Mr. Pelly. There is no basis to assert
11	that it does. The contract says what it says. It's very
12	clear. As a matter of law Your Honor can see that and
13	dismiss the claim.
14	THE COURT: Let's talk about the County then.
15	MR. PILSK: Okay. On the County's side of the
16	breach of contract claim it's actually very similar.
17	Their claim as asserted is that the County has failed to
18	adhere to maximum adherence to the flight procedure to
19	the departure procedures.
20	Again, the plain language of the contract does not
21	require that. It requires three specific things to
22	encourage maximum adherence to the flight track. There
23	is no allegation that the County failed to do any of
24	those things.
25	Instead, the allegation is more open-ended that it

1	hasn't done other things that might also have the effect
2	of encouraging compliance with the flight tracks. There
3	simply is no claim there is no claim alleged that they
4	have breached the County has breached any allegation
5	of the contract.
6	THE COURT: Aren't they taking the position that the
7	County has taken action to have the flights fly close to
8	Mar-A-Largo, and that in itself is a violation of the
9	settlement agreement?
10	MR. PILSK: None of the obligations prohibit the
11	County from doing that. Just within the four corners of
12	the settlement agreement, nothing in the settlement
13	agreement prohibits the County from doing it.
14	Again, the only obligation regarding sorry.
15	THE COURT: What about the plaintiff points out in
16	their response that the settlement agreement states that
17	the intent of this agreement is to attempt to achieve
18	maximum adherence to the preferred flight tracks.
19	And the agreement also states that the County, the
20	Club and Trump wish to take measures to encourage the FAA
21	to enforce a strict adherence to the preferred flight
22	tracks.
23	MR. PILSK: Certainly those are quotes. Those are
24	correct, but Paragraph 10
25	THE COURT: Doesn't that impose any obligations upon

the County in that regard or is that language just 1 2 aspirational language? That specific language is aspirational. 3 MR. PILSK: The operative language in Paragraph 10 is specific. First of all, it's to encourage maximum adherence not to 5 achieve maximum adherence. 6 Secondly, it sets forth specific obligations that 7 the parties said this is how you will fulfill that 8 9 obligation. These are the three reporting requirements specified in Paragraphs 10-A, B and C. 10 Those are the only obligations for adherence to the 11 12 flight procedures. There are I think eight other obligations set forth in the County -- that the County is 13 obligated to under the contract. 14 15 Again, none of them require an open-ended obligation to achieve maximum adherence to the flight tracks or do 16 17 anything other than what is specified. You see these are -- if you look this is in the previous pages of the 18 paragraph under County actions. 19 It's conduct studies, to work with the FAA, to 20 outline an aggressive close and departure procedure, 21 22 issue a letter of airmen, a whole series of basically 23 reporting actions that were taken years ago, but not an open-ended obligation to do everything to achieve maximum 24 adherence. 25

1 Again, on the face of the four corners of the 2 complaint there is no claims -- there is no obligation of the County to do everything in its power or in fact, 3 anything other than what is specifically identified to encourage adherence to the departure procedures. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 7 MR. PILSK: Now, turning to the claims where the This is the trespass -- I will defenses are in common. 8 start with the trespass and nuisance claims. I want to start with the real core of their 10 allegations here on the undue influence. There is no 11 12 real argument, and the law is very clear, that there is no nuisance claims for an airport that's operating 13 lawfully in accordance with its ordinary and customary 14 15 manner. Similarly, there is no -- the law is very clear that 16 a trespass -- there is no trespass action if someone is 17 using the property of another under a claim of right or 18 under a right to use it. 19 Plaintiffs here try to get around that clear law by 20 arguing that the airport director is using undue 21 influence to compel the FAA air traffic controllers to 22 23 deviate from the normal departure procedures and fly over Mar-A-Largo. 24 25 Now, to put this claim in context, I want to keep

looking at the settlement agreement which is attached to the complaint as an exhibit, and therefore, part of the four corners of the complaint for purposes of the motion to dismiss.

Look at the whereas clause because they outline the history of the flight procedures at the airport that puts this claim in context. I'm looking first on page four of the settlement agreement that talks about the -- the whereas clause that talks about the development of flight procedures. It's part of a public Part 150 process to develop a noise compatibility program.

Mr. Trump at the time objected to the procedures, objected to the runway heading procedures that's currently in place that would have aircraft going about 1,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo.

It refers to the fact that the FAA issues the orders and the FAA enforces those orders. It specifies the current flight path on the runway heading 1,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo. It also acknowledges that notwithstanding the preferred flight track due to wind, weather and other causes, some transport category aircraft that are departing and arriving at PBIA are varying from the preferred flight track including some aircraft that may be flying in close proximity or directly over Mar-A-Largo or to the south of Mar-A-Largo.

1 Then we get to the language that you quoted earlier, Your Honor, that the County and Trump and the Club wish to take measures to encourage the FAA to enforce a strict 3 adherence to the preferred flight track as safety will allow. 5 Then it recites the County's position that the 6 7 County does not control or enforce the flight tracks. The point of this is that as long as early as 20 years 8 ago, aircraft were following flight path procedures that departed on the runway heading from PBIA approximately 10 1,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo and that due to wind, 11 weather and other factors aircraft deviated from that 12 procedure and overflew Mar-A-Largo. 13 There is nothing knew about this. This is part of 14 the customary and legal usage and customary practices at 15 16 the airport. The gist of the complaint here is that notwithstanding that, notwithstanding that history, that 17 something has changed. 18 That something isn't wind, weather or air traffic 19 control instructions, it's this undue influence by the 20 airport director. In support of that frankly 21 22 counter-factual assertion because we know plaintiffs effectively concede that aircraft always overflew 23 Mar-A-Largo. 24 Plaintiffs offer no real facts. There is just this 25

conclusory assertion that the airport director has used undue influence to somehow compel the FAA air traffic controllers to do this and it somehow made the FAA air traffic controllers agents of the County.

There is no statement of what this influence is, of how it is exercised, who he might have talked to or called, how he influenced other people. Much less how it was exercised, not just over one individual, there is not just one air traffic controller up there, there is an entire staff and supervisors and managers, a whole network of people who manage the flight procedures at PBIA.

No facts whatsoever to link their speculative surmise only because aircraft are overflying Mar-A-Largo there must be some nefarious plot to explain it instead of what the history shows, which is that aircraft have always overflown Mar-A-Largo from time to time due to wind, weather and other factors.

The Florida Supreme Court and Flo-Sun make clear that kind of conclusory pleading when you're talking about a complicit, if not conspiracy, among numerous public officials to advocate their own responsibilities in order to achieve some sort of public or inflict a public nuisance or harm against an individual is simply not sufficient.

1 Not under a heightened pleading standard, but under a notice pleadings standard itself. As stated, this conclusory allegation is simply not sufficient to survive 3 review in a motion to dismiss. Even apart from that, turning to the nuisance claim 5 first, as we have laid out in the complaint, the FAA and 6 the federal government have exclusive control over the 7 navigable airspace. They have exclusive sovereignty over 8 the airspace and exclusive control over air traffic controller procedures. 10 The County has no legal role in that process. 11 12 Pilots are required to obey the FAA air traffic controller's instructions. Everything that happens with 13 departing aircraft is in the hands of either the pilot or 14 If the pilots are following FAA instructions, 15 the FAA. they're obeying the law and the fights are taking off in 16 17 a lawful manner. There is simply no basis to conclude here that 18 anything is -- on that fact alone, there is nothing 19 unlawful about the way aircraft are flying because 20 they're flying pursuant to FAA air traffic controller's 21 22 instructions. 23 There is no allegation in the complaint that the air traffic controller's instructions themselves are improper 24 or an abuse of discretion of the controllers. 25

Similarly on the trespass claim, the navigable 1 airspace, including the airspace necessary for taking off and landing, is within the exclusive control of the 3 United States. Aircraft have a right to use that to land and depart from airports under FAA control. 5 Aircraft operate there as a matter of right and 6 7 there can't be a trespass as a matter of state law. Plaintiffs spend time in their brief trying to 8 distinguish the various cases. We have talked about that in the papers. 10 The fact is they have cited no case where a trespass 11 or nuisance action was found against an airport. For the 12 very simple reason airports operate -- aircraft operate 13 in the navigable airspace lawfully and properly as a 14 matter of law. There simply is no claim under those two 15 theories. 16 Finally, one more point with respect to nuisance and 17 that is the special injury factor. You know, really I 18 think the two parties have narrowed it down. We cite the 19 Page (phonetic) case, an older Supreme Court case that 20 makes it very clear that when you're dealing with a sort 21 of an atmospheric effect that is spread over a wide 22 23 distance, that there is no special injury because really everybody is affected in the same manner. 24 25 They rely on the Surfside case that involves the

impacts on a particular piece of property by an adjacent
municipal dump and draw the broad conclusion from that
that any injury to property is per se a special injury
that can support a claim for public nuisance.

I think that's the wrong rule to follow. I think the way to look at that is ask well, what would the remedy be and how we would enforce it. They ask for an injunction. If you issue an injunction to abate the nuisance to this plaintiff, you are just going to move the impact over to another property owner, and she is going to be in here asking for an junction to abate the nuisance.

You move it again, and there will be another property owner. It underscores two I think important points here. One, that there is no special injury because any property owner can make the same set of allegations and allege the same kind of harm from this alleged public nuisance. No ones is fundamentally different. There may be differences of degree, but not in kind.

THE COURT: When you say differences in degree so when the plaintiff goes at length in the complaint detailing all of these special attributes about this particular property, that it's a national landmark or all these other kind of things regarding the limestone and

1 the effect that it's having on there as being a unique 2 piece of property, your position is that it's just what? Those are particular attributes of those 3 MR. PILSK: pieces of property. There is nothing to suggest that other properties don't have similar attributes and aren't 5 similarly affected by the noise emissions and vibrations 6 from the aircraft. 7 It's just the effect of the atmospheric pollution on 8 their particular property, but it's affecting everyone in maybe just different degrees. Maybe their property is 10 somewhat more susceptible than other properties, we don't 11 12 know. They haven't alleged that no one else is affected in the same way. I don't think they can. 13 And I think that's still the problem is what makes 14 them so particularly different in kind. And the law, 15 that is the standard, different in kind, not just degree 16 17 from others but --THE COURT: I know it's under inverse condemnation, 18 but what about the Foster V. City of Gainesville case 19 they cite? 20 MR. PILSK: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I think that is 21 22 more of an inverse condemnation. 23 THE COURT: Well, speak about that right now since it's on my mind. 24 Well, I think that the standard 25 MR. PILSK: Okay.

in Florida for inverse condemnation is we have to show one of two things.

Either substantial ouster and depravation of all beneficial uses of the property or the aircraft invade the plaintiff's super-adjacent airspace causing direct and immediate interference with the use of the land.

Now, they don't plead substantial ouster and depravation as I understand it. I don't think they can.

I mean it's operating -- it seems to be functioning pretty much fine from the pleadings. There hasn't been a substantial ouster.

On the second prong though they don't allege that the aircraft invades the super-adjacent airspace. Now, their response brief focuses on the fact that's not a requirement, but every case that is considered in any detail, the application of the general standard for inverse condemnation in the airport context has required that or found invasion of the super-adjacent airspace.

THE COURT: As I understand it, and correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought the plaintiff's position was that so long as there is a diminution in value that's satisfied the requirements for inverse condemnation?

MR. PILSK: In the airport context that may go to the second prong of substantial depravation, directly interfering with the use of the land, but not -- but they

1 still have to show diminution in airspace. 2 In the Foster case the flights were as low as 220 feet above the plaintiff's property. In Hillsborough 3 County Aviation v. Benitez, the Court there found that the super-adjacent airspace was between 250 and 500 feet 5 above sea level -- above ground, excuse me. 6 THE COURT: Well, the City of Gainesville case, and 7 I'm just reading from the plaintiff's brief, argues that 8 the residue from the airplanes covers everything in the yards, prevents them from hanging their clothes out to 10 dry, cooking out, gardening and the vibrations from the 11 12 flights caused cracked windows and the fan to separate from the ceiling in one of the homes. 13 There was a significant decrease in the value of the 14 15 property, and that was found to apparently satisfy the requirements for an inverse condemnation. What is so 16 17 different about that than what we have here that's alleged? 18 MR. PILSK: Well, first of all, they haven't alleged 19 impacts or anything like that. I mean, they really have 20 been general in nature. They talk about general 21 22 interference and displeasure, but there is no specifics. There is no indication of -- there is no testimony 23 or rather pleadings about ash being distributed 24

There is no testimony --

25

everywhere.

1 THE COURT: I thought there were allegations about soot and the like that was --Just generally that it falls, but no 3 MR. PILSK: discussion of the impact that it has on the property other than the speculative allegation that it may be 5 causing deterioration of the limestone. 6 7 This is no discussion of how it's impairing their use of the property, and I think that is really the key. 8 There is no allegation that they're flying solo to avoid the super-adjacent airspace, which again in the Foster 10 case, the flights were as low as 220 above the 11 12 plaintiff's property. THE COURT: Was that what Foster hinges on the fact 13 that it was 220 feet? Would it make any difference if it 14 was 1,000 feet? 15 MR. PILSK: I think it would under the standard if 16 17 you're not in the super-adjacent airspace. If they're high above in what is clearly a public airspace and no 18 part of the private airspace, there would be no taking 19 under Florida law. It would just be an impact that 20 wasn't compensable. 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. Sorry to distract you over to the 23 inverse side. MR. PILSK: That's fine. If you look at the 24 No. 25 other cases, you know, the Hillsborough County Aviation,

1	the noise from overflights frightened the plaintiff's
2	children and pets, interrupted sleep, caused hearing
3	damage, damaged the building and soot and made certain
4	activities impossible.
5	THE COURT: What about the Young case, Young versus
6	Palm Beach County?
7	MR. PILSK: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I don't have that
8	one in front of me.
9	THE COURT: Get back maybe to the inverse
10	condemnation because I am concerned about this inverse
11	condemnation claim.
12	It's cited in Young versus Palm Beach County the
13	appellate court overturned dismissal of the complaint
14	against the airport for inverse condemnation. The
15	allegations in that complaint were the flights were made
16	the flights made family and telephone conversations
17	difficult and watching television difficult.
18	If that's all that's necessary it seems to set a low
19	bar for inverse condemnation, does it not?
20	MR. PILSK: Well, again if you first you have the
21	super-adjacent airspace requirement which is missing
22	here.
23	Second, the complaint here really doesn't allege the
24	kind of interference with the use that rises even to that
25	level.

1	THE COURT: Well, that super-adjacent airspace issue,
2	was that satisfied in the Young case?
3	MR. PILSK: Your Honor, I apologize but I don't have
4	the altitude in front of me. I can get back to you on
5	that if you would like?
6	THE COURT: Okay.
7	MR. PILSK: I think we have covered the substance of
8	the argument on inverse condemnation. They have simply
9	failed to plead both the invasion of the super-adjacent
10	airspace in enough details and specifics of how their
11	property has been harmed by the overflights to satisfy
12	the interference and use prong of the test. Under both
13	prongs the inverse condemnation claim fails to state a
14	cause of action.
15	The final point then to make relates to the claim
16	for injunctive relief. I understand it's somewhat
17	unusual to seek to dismiss a claim for relief, but they
18	pled them as separate counts.
19	THE COURT: So you're really moving to strike those?
20	MR. PILSK: Yes, Your Honor, for really two basic
21	reasons.
22	One, an injunction to abate the nuisance in effect
23	would be to stop the aircraft from flying over
24	Mar-A-Largo, and that is clearly preempted.
25	The federal government has exclusive control over

1 flight procedures and only the federal government can 2 make changes to the flight procedures. The FAA and the federal government are not parties to this action. 3 is simply no authority for the County, or frankly for the Court, to order that kind of relief. 5 It really makes sense because, you know, if this 6 7 Court can afford a remedy to a private plaintiff to make changes to the air traffic control system it effects not 8 just plaintiff and not just other residents under the flight tracks, but more fundamentally it effects the 10 ability of the FAA to control the flight path. 11 Then really where is the end of it at that point. 12 Again, you make this one move for this plaintiff, there 13 is another plaintiff that comes forward making similar 14 claims, and you got to move it again. 15 Suddenly, the Palm Beach County circuit court is in 16 17 charge of air traffic procedures not the FAA. simply preempted by federal law. 18 Similarly, it's contrary to the separation of powers 19 doctrine really for very similar reasons. 20 The decision not just of how to direct air traffic, but how to 21 22 mitigate noise and how to address noise problems is fundamentally a legislative decision for the political 23 branches, not something that the court -- for the 24 judicial branch. 25

1 Really plaintiffs themselves make clear in their 2 papers why their injunction claims are barred by this They say the factors that are involved are 3 beyond the technical aspects of how to get planes on or off the ground, but are more about how to spread the 5 noise around or in this case concentrate it. 6 It really has little to do with policy evaluation 7 involving the taking off and landing of aircraft. 8 in their opposition at 18. This isn't about the technical aspects of taking 10 off, it's about how to allocate the noise. That's really 11 12 a legislative determination that has to be made by balancing the benefits of the airport and the impacts on 13 different residences, and what is the most effective way 14 to balance those benefits and impacts. 15 The fact is as made clear in the settlement 16 17 agreement 20 years ago the County went through a very public process to elevate options and made a decision 18 that is now memorialized in County ordinances. 19 This plaintiff comes in 20 years later and tries to 20 reargue the policy arguments it lost 20 years ago in the 21 22 guise of a private, nuisance and trespass action. 23 The net effect would simply be to shift the burdens from plaintiff to other residences in the area without 24 25 even a legislative process, without any opportunity to be

1 heard or defend themselves. This kind of balancing of harms and benefits and allocation of impacts is a matter for the legislative 3 branch not for the judicial branch. The remedy they seek in injunctive relief is simply barred by the separation 5 of powers doctrine. 6 7 I think, Your Honor, that covers my initial presentation unless you have any questions. 8 THE COURT: I will give you the last word. MR. PILSK: Thank you. 10 Mr. Rogow, good morning. 11 THE COURT: Good morning, Judge. I think that like 12 MR. ROGOW: many cases you have to start with how one looks at it in 13 the prism through which one tries to address these 14 15 issues. This is not the classic the airplanes are flying 16 17 from the airport and they're disturbing me. This claim is that they have targeted Mar-A-Largo by virtue of Mr. 18 Pelly's actions influencing the people who are sending 19 the planes out. 20 Let me start with the contract. 21 22 THE COURT: Can I take you off track for just a 23 second? MR. ROGOW: 24 Yes. Since we're talking about Mr. Pelly, one 25 THE COURT:

1 of the arguments is in terms of abateness and lacks specificity. When I read the complaint, I was at a little bit of 3 a loss to understand what exactly, aside from the allegations of undue influence when it comes to the 5 6 County and the FAA, what power hold does he have on the 7 federal government? I'm not sure I understand that when I read the 8 complaint. MR. ROGOW: He is the director of the airport so the 10 airport operations are under his control. 11 The flight patterns are not under his control, but our allegation is 12 that Mr. Pelly, through his influence, through his 13 efforts instead of complying with the --14 15 THE COURT: What influence? Talking to the people that do -- sending 16 MR. ROGOW: 17 out the flights. Fanning is really what we're after. If they were fanning we wouldn't be in this 18 situation. Mr. Pelly has communicated to the people, to 19 the flight controllers that they shouldn't be fanning, 20 they should be sending these planes out due east which 21 22 then takes them over Mar-A-Largo. 23 So this allegation which we're making is based upon information that we have where we think that Mr. Pelly 24 has influenced the flight patterns by his relationship 25

1 and his directorship of the airport. Now, this is something that we're going to have to If we can't prove it, then this case is lost on 3 summary judgment. That is what this case is about. There is no 5 question Mr. Pelly is a signature to the agreement. 6 Ι 7 mean, the agreement in the first paragraph, the settlement agreement involves Mr. Pelly and says that he 8 is a party to the agreement. Then when one takes a look --10 THE COURT: How do you respond to that because I 11 12 think he's a signature only for another reason and that is that apparently he needed to be released as part of 13 the prior lawsuit. 14 MR. ROGOW: Well, whatever his reasons are for being 15 16 a party, he is a party. 17 In the agreement it talks about -- and Mr. Pelly obviously is an employee of the County and whatever the 18 County is going to be doing here is it's going to be 19 doing through Mr. Pelly. 20 The language is that the County will take measures 21 22 to encourage the FAA to enforce as strict adherence to the preferred flight tracks as safety will allow. 23 already discussed that. 24 THE COURT: Reading that language does the County, 25

1 the Club and Trump wish to take measures to have the FAA to enforce a strict adherence to the preferred flight 2 It doesn't say Pelly. 3 MR. ROGOW: Pelly is the County in this context in terms of dealing with the airport. 5 THE COURT: Then why name Pelly? 6 7 Why not name Pelly, is that your MR. ROGOW: question, Your Honor? 8 9 THE COURT: Well, my question is why name Pelly if the argument is -- well, Pelly is not named here. 10 it's the County, Pelly, the Club and Trump wish to take 11 measures, it seems to me you would have a stronger 12 argument. 13 It's simply limited to the County, the Club and 14 15 Trump. 16 MR. ROGOW: That's correct. 17 THE COURT: You make it seem to argue that Pelly breached the agreement, that language. 18 MR. ROGOW: Because Pelly is responsible for carrying 19 out the County's obligations vis-a-vie this agreement 20 with the operation of the airport. 21 22 THE COURT: I mean, assuming that's true then wouldn't it be sufficient to simply name the County then 23 as you said since Mr. Pelly is an agent who works for the 24 25 County?

is an employee of the County. I think on the breach of contract argument THE COURT: What would you lose if Pelly fell out of the breach of contract? MR. ROGOW: Nothing on the breach of contract. Nothing on the breach of contract. We can survive without Pelly in the breach of contract. Our reading of the contract, and Pelly being a part to it and the obligation, the obligation is in paragraphe eight. Again, it names the County. The County shall continue to support the fanning of the Stage 2 aircraft under the procedures set forth.	
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14 under the procedures set forth.	
Now, that is an important part of this agreement.	
The County shall continue to support the fanning. That	
is what we're talking about here because the answer is	Ĺ£
the County did encourage that and continued to support	
it, then there would be no breach of contract, but that	
is the heart of our case.	
21 THE COURT: The County says that's just aspirational	L
22 language.	
MR. ROGOW: Well, I don't see how it	
THE COURT: The real duties and obligations of the	
25 County are set forth and enumerated specifically in one	

1 through eight or however many it is. MR. ROGOW: But all of those duties are in pursuit of and in pursuance of this promise by the County to 3 support the fanning and to encourage a maximum adherence. 5 What we have here is an allegation that they have 6 7 done just the opposite. They have not supported and indeed they have discouraged it. So the antithesis of 8 encouraging is discourage, and that is what our complaint 9 alleges that they have discouraged. 10 If they have discouraged under this agreement then 11 12 they have failed to discontinue to support the fanning, then they are in breach of this contract. 13 That's the breach of contract claim. 14 I think all of this takes us to the important part 15 that this is a targeted kind of action that we're talking 16 about. All of these cases --17 THE COURT: Can I just interrupt you once more? 18 MR. ROGOW: 19 Yes. THE COURT: I just want to get Mr. Pelly out of the 20 way so we can concentrate on the County. 21 22 Likewise, do you need Pelly for your inverse condemnation claim? 23 MR. ROGOW: 24 No. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

1 MR. ROGOW: Many of the things that have been argued 2 are issues of fact. Your Honor focused on the issue of fact, can we prove that Pelly did this. 3 For the purpose of this argument we have to assume that the allegations, take the allegations of the 5 complaint as true and therefore, we're faced with what I 6 call a targeted kind of an action. 7 I guess you could frame it this way if one showed 8 9 that an airport employee was able to achieve the direct flying over of your property, knowing that it was going 10 to cause harm to the property, diminish the value, 11 interfere with the enjoyment of the property, would you 12 be able to state a cause of action. 13 That is what this case is about because we're not 14 trying to effect how the FAA sends out planes except to 15 the extent that we're alleging that the FAA is sending 16 17 out these planes because of the acts of Mr. Pelly directly over Mar-A-Largo. 18 So the question is is does --19 THE COURT: Is the argument that Mr. Pelly is in 20 effect exercising some undue influence over the FAA? 21 MR, ROGOW: 22 Yes. Yes. That he is -- when I say undue influence, his actions -- that is the heart of this 23 complaint. 24 His actions have caused the FAA -- and this is 25

1	something that we have to prove down the line, caused the
2	FAA to not adhere to the fanning procedure but to have
3	this targeted kind of impact upon Mar-A-Largo by virtue
4	of these planes being sent off directly to the east and
5	not being fanned out.
6	If they're fanned out the argument that's made
7	about everybody would come here and complain, that is
8	just not so. If they are fanned out under FAA
9	procedures, then everybody is sharing the same noise, the
10	same discomfort, if there is discomfort from that from
11	people who are east of the airport.
12	That is not what this case is about.
13	THE COURT: Why isn't this argument being made to the
14	FAA?
15	MR. ROGOW: Because in this situation we have an
16	agreement with the County so the focus is on the County.
17	Will it reach the FAA at some point? I mean, we
18	don't have to add all of the parties to a case at the
19	beginning.
20	We focused on this because our position is is that
21	the reason this is occurring is because the County has
22	failed to abide by the contract, and Mr. Pelly has taken
23	action that focuses these planes over Mar-A-Largo.
24	THE COURT: It's almost like an indispensable
25	argument I mean, an indispensable party. It seems to

1 me that the County seems to be arguing that it's not Mr. 2 Pelly, it's not even the County, it's the FAA who has this -- who is in charge of making these kinds of 3 decisions. So joining the County or joining Mr. Pelly is 5 meaningless without having control over the FAA. 6 MR. ROGOW: Well, they haven't moved to dismiss for 7 failure to join an indispensable party. 8 THE COURT: They haven't used those words, but it's almost that kind of argument they're making to me. 10 You know, like in any case it's an 11 MR. ROGOW: incremental process. I mean, we have a contract here. 12 understand what their ultimate defense is going to be, 13 it's not us, the FAA is making the decision. 14 We will see what the proof shows with regard to 15 The FAA, no question about it, the air traffic 16 17 controllers do make decisions, but if the air traffic controller's decisions are being influenced by or even 18 directed by Mr. Pelly, then Mr. Pelly and the County have 19 responsibilities. 20 THE COURT: Was there any kind of smoking gun here 21 22 for this? I mean, is there some kind of memo, e-mail from Mr. 23 Pelly to the air traffic controllers telling them we want 24 you to fly these planes deliberately or direct these 25

1	planes directly over Mr. Trump's property?
2	Is there anything like that?
3	MR. ROGOW: I don't have it in hand now. I hope to
4	have it as the case progresses. We have information from
5	people at the airport who have given us information that
6	we believe supports this claim.
7	Mr. Marion, I think wanted to address
8	MR. MARION: Can I speak for a moment?
9	THE COURT: Sure.
10	MR. MARION: I hate to interrupt Mr. Rogow's
11	argument, but we have talked to the air traffic managers.
12	Just so you know, the FAA doesn't care where you
13	take off and land. They don't give a hoot about that.
14	What they care about is whether or not your flight tracks
15	are safe.
16	They have had flight tracks all over the County off
17	the airport runway in the past. They're all safe and
18	they're all approved by the FAA, but the airport
19	proprietor, Bruce Pelly in this instance, has a great
20	deal of influence over the FAA.
21	He can call the FAA on the federal level and say I
22	want to fly these flights directly off the runway and
23	straight east and as long as it's safe, the FAA is going
24	to say fine.
25	The County or the airport proprietor has an

1 obligation to the citizens around the airport to fan noise abatement. Under the statutes and the regulations that is their obligation. 3 If Mr. Pelly decides that he just wants to run that aircraft straight over Mar-A-Largo, he can do it. 5 long as the FAA says it's safe, they will approve it. 6 7 What we're saying is that we have talked to people that will assist us in proving that we only fly straight 8 over Mar-A-Largo. We don't fly it anywhere else anymore, and that's in violation of the settlement agreement. 10 THE COURT: So is the assertion that we don't fly it 11 12 anywhere else, we only fly it over Mar-A-Largo because Mr. Pelly tells us only to fly it over Mar-A-Largo, is 13 that essentially the argument? 14 MR. MARION: The FAA? 15 16 THE COURT: No, I mean --17 MR. MARION: The County? THE COURT: I mean you say people. 18 MR. MARION: I have talked to people and that's where 19 the flights are. 20 THE COURT: Is that what they're saying that Mr. 21 22 Pelly is telling them ignore the fanning and just send 23 these planes right over Mar-A-Largo? MR. MARION: What we have alleged is what we believe 24 25 we can prove, Your Honor.

1	THE COURT: Well, I mean, what I'm hearing here seems
2	to go beyond what I have read in the complaint as far as
3	the allegations are concerned.
4	MR. MARION: The factual evidence may well go beyond
5	that, Judge. We have pled a bare minimum amount to get
6	this thing going.
7	You know, if we're foreclosed from going and proving
8	what we think we can prove, that will be a travesty.
9	THE COURT: I'm just not sure that the language
10	again that I see in the complaint, which generally is
11	conclusory in nature, undue influence, these kinds of
12	things, whether that is sufficient.
13	Now, again what I'm hearing here goes beyond that.
14	Maybe had those things been alleged in the complaint,
15	maybe that would satisfy the County's requirement for
16	specificity and the Courts.
17	MR. ROGOW: Your Honor, the Flo-Sun case, which is a
18	case they cite for the lack of specificity, has to do
19	with the sugar cane out in West Palm Beach County. There
20	was an administrative remedy.
21	This was a suit I think Governor Kirk brought the
22	suit and it ended up before the Supreme Court. I don't
23	think that that is a measure of what is necessary in
24	order to stay the claim.
25	I mean, our claim is a narrow claim.

1 THE COURT: There is also these undue influences, 2 isn't that entirely conclusory? MR. ROGOW: It says deliberate and malicious 3 No. that he has directed this to happen. So in terms of how much do you have to put into a 5 complaint in order to state the cause of action, clearly 6 7 the elements here of nuisance, trespass and inverse condemnation are met. The answer to Your Honor's 8 9 question is about Young, and it doesn't talk at all about adjacent properties. 10 THE COURT: I was going to ask you about that. 11 MR. ROGOW: It doesn't. It doesn't mention that. 12 Again, it's not necessary because that is not the 13 nature of this case. This case is a focused case about 14 15 targeted actions. I mean, as I started at the beginning in terms of 16 17 the construct here, if there were targeted actions saying fly these planes, and indeed if he could do it. 18 get back to the ultimate issue. 19 That's why I said that we're going to have to prove 20 this, and if we don't prove this, there is no case. 21 22 if he said to the FAA people, I want you to fly these planes directly east and they did because of the reasons 23 Mr. Marion talked about, they don't care as long as it's 24 25 going in a safe way.

1 If he did that and then it caused the damages that we have alleged, we have stated a cause of action. The question Your Honor is asking is whether or not we can 3 prove the cause of action, but that is the next step in this case. 5 THE COURT: Well, again, I'm not necessarily asking 6 7 whether you can prove it. I understand the difference. I'm simply asking from a pleading standpoint are the 8 allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, that is, are they alleged with requisite specificity that 10 is required? 11 There has got to be some specificity. And what I'm 12 troubled with, as I indicated to you, is simply whether 13 allegations such as directed or undue influence, whether 14 15 those are sufficient or not. 16 I mean, obviously you take the position that they 17 are? MR. ROGOW: Well, certainly directing, certainly 18 deliberate, certainly malicious, those are specific terms 19 that are tied into what we have alleged he has done and 20 the overarching thing that we allege is that he has 21 22 directed through the FAA, through his influence with the 23 FAA, to have these planes flying directly over Mar-A-Largo. 24 THE COURT: What influence does he have? 25

1 MR. ROGOW: He runs the airport. The relationship 2 between the FAA and the airport, of course, is intertwined. 3 THE COURT: So it's almost like he has the same influence I guess as any airport director, right? 5 MR. ROGOW: Well, I can't speak for any airport 6 7 He has been the airport director for a long director. time. 8 9 There is no question that the airport works hand in hand with the federal government, with the FAA in running 10 the airport. There are different interests at stake. 11 The FAA's interest is getting these planes out and flight 12 safety. 13 Mr. Pelly's interest are different in terms of the 14 operation of the airport. Certainly noise is an issue 15 There is no question that this area of 16 for the County. 17 noise abatement and noise concern is not preempted. mean there are cases. Fort Lauderdale Airport has it all 18 the time now on what they do to try to abate noise, but 19 that's in a general concept. 20 That is the difference in this case. 21 22 specific concept. We're not saying that we want to have a hand in how they decide to fan the aircraft as the 23 aircraft leaves Palm Beach Airport. What we're saying is 24 the aircraft cannot be sent out over Mar-A-Largo because 25

1	Mr. Pelly is achieving that result in violation of the
2	County's contract, in violation of his obligations we
3	think in terms of noise abatement.
4	THE COURT: Are you seeking the complete prohibition
5	of any aircraft flying over Mar-A-Largo?
6	MR. ROGOW: Pardon me?
7	THE COURT: Are you seeking the prohibition of any
8	aircraft flying over Mar-A-Largo?
9	MR. ROGOW: No. No. No. That's not the point
10	of this at all. It goes back to fanning.
11	THE COURT: How many planes can fly over Mar-A-Largo?
12	MR. ROGOW: How many?
13	THE COURT: Yes. In your view what would be the
14	permissible amount?
15	It seems to me you're saying well, there are too
16	many. They can fly some planes, but they're directing
17	too many planes over Mar-A-Largo, we want less planes.
18	MR. ROGOW: We want a procedure that takes care of
19	the aircraft leaving in a fair way that spreads whatever
20	noise or discomfort there may be among all the community
21	that is served by the airport.
22	I can't tell you that I want 10 planes or 15 planes,
23	but if there is fanning because fanning is the answer.
24	That's the reason there is such a thing as fanning. The
25	planes get sent out in a way that doesn't concentrate the

1 noise, the vibrations, the obnoxious fumes in one area. That's what this complaint is about, that is what has happened now. The question is why is it happening. 3 Our complaint alleges that it's happening because Mr. Pelly, as an agent of the County, has caused this to 5 occur. 6 7 That is really all our complaint is about. So the remedy is not to prohibit planes from flying over 8 Mar-A-Largo because we can't do that. We simply can't do that. 10 The remedy is what is mentioned in paragraph eight 11 of the agreement, fanning. So if they have discouraged 12 that, the opposite of encouraging, if they have failed to 13 support that by the actions of Mr. Pelly, then we have 14 stated a claim. 15 The Foster case, the Gainesville case, obviously 16 they're talking about damage that is measured by the lack 17 of failure to be able to use the property. 18 course, is a situation that is different from ours. 19 Ours is a stronger argument because our argument is 20 that the damage here is directed to Mar-A-Largo. 21 not a general airport claim. But if you had a general 22 23 airport claim that could give rise to an inverse condemnation, obviously the Foster versus City of 24 25 Gainesville case supports that.

1 The Young case supports that and reverses the case 2 that was dismissed on the complaint because it does state Is it a trespass, yes. 3 a cause of action. Is it inverse condemnation, yes. Is it a breach of contract, yes, if we can prove these things. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Are there any cases that -- and 6 7 maybe there are and I just missed them or I don't recall them in your brief that have upheld injunctive relief of 8 the sort that you're requesting? I don't know of any case off the top of 10 MR. ROGOW: my head that does that, but here is the other problem, 11 12 Judge. There aren't any cases that have the targeted claim 13 that we have. All of these airport cases are people 14 being disturbed by the general operation of the airport. 15 That is not what we are talking about. We are talking 16 17 about people being harmed by the specific acts of the airport director leading to this kind of damage. 18 Assuming we can prove this, could there be an 19 injunction against Mr. Pelly, against the County to 20 enjoin them from interfering with the fanning procedure? 21 22 I mean, thinking ahead as this case would play out, 23 let's assume the FAA people say Pelly told us to fly it directly east and we're doing it because it works, it's 24 not a problem for us except it is a problem in terms of 25

- what the consequences are.
- 2 So if the FAA people say we'll fan, it's not a
- 3 problem for us, then the injunction would be aimed at the
- 4 County saying don't interfere with the fanning.
- 5 That's really where we want to get back to.
- 6 THE COURT: I guess I'm still not exactly sure if you
- 7 were granted the relief that you're requesting in your
- 8 counts for injunctive relief, what would actually the
- 9 County be prohibited from doing and would that of itself,
- 10 without the assistance or cooperation of the FAA, grant
- 11 you the relief that you're requesting?
- 12 MR. ROGOW: It would. If the FAA says look, fanning
- is fine with us and that is what we -- that's what we
- 14 would perhaps prefer to do, but for whatever reason we
- have been sending them off directly east over Mar-A-Largo
- 16 because this is what Pelly wanted.
- 17 So if the injunction tells the County that you
- 18 cannot do that, that you have to support fanning, you
- 19 cannot discourage maximum adherence, then we would have
- 20 been successful.
- Then we would be back to fanning. That's where we
- 22 are. I think what happens is when one looks at this,
- 23 we're saying that we don't want the planes flying over
- 24 Mar-A-Largo. We can't say that. We can't control that.
- I agree we can't control that.

1	THE COURT: Again, if you were granted this
2	injunctive relief, what would that require? Would that
3	then make Mr. Pelly get on the phone with the FAA and say
4	change things now?
5	MR. ROGOW: It would require him to get off of the
6	phone with the FAA and not direct them to do what they're
7	doing which is the source of our complaint.
8	Basically, leave it to the FAA. I mean, the
9	question you asked is should the FAA be in here somehow
10	or other. The answer is if
11	THE COURT: I'm wondering if you can get the relief
12	that you wanted without the FAA?
13	MR. ROGOW: Yes. Yes. If the case, as it pans out,
14	shows that the FAA does view fanning as a method of
15	minimizing the kind of discomfort that's caused by
16	airport noise, and that is what they would usually do and
17	Mr. Pelly and the County are then prohibited from
18	interfering with the FAA's processes and planning of
19	airplanes, then we would have the remedy that we want.
20	I mean, the remedy that we want is to stop the
21	County from interfering with what the FAA's fanning
22	procedures are. That is the heart of what we have
23	alleged, that he has interfered with that.
24	If he has interfered with that and the consequence
25	of that interference is the planes are now flying over

1 Mar-A-Largo, then stopping the County and Mr. Pelly from 2 that interference would achieve the results that we want. I mean, I hope that I make this very clear that we 3 are not controlling what the FAA -- or seeking to control what the FAA does. There will be times when the FAA will 5 send them directly over Mar-A-Largo, but it will be part 6 7 of the fanning that goes on in certain situations. I assume there are wind changes and things like that 8 that lead the FAA to send planes north, south, whichever way they want to send them. 10 I don't even know if they take off west. 11 I know they do in Fort Lauderdale, but all of that is up to the 12 What is at the heart of this case is the 13 interference by the County in violation of the contract 14 and the interference by Mr. Pelly. 15 16 Again, it's something we're going to have to prove, 17 did he interfere. If the FAA people say listen, this is it, Mr. Pelly never spoke to us, he had no influence on 18 this at all, we decided we always want to send these 19 planes over Mar-A-Largo, if that is the way this case 20 pans out, it's a different problem. 21 22 It's not this case at all, and there is no relief 23 that you could give us in that situation. But that is not what we think this case is going to turn out to be. 24 25 From the beginning when they signed this agreement,

1	fanning was the remedy, support fanning. If Mr. Pelly is
2	not supporting fanning, then we have stated a claim for
3	all of these counts because we meet all of the
4	requirements on each of the counts.
5	THE COURT: Anything that you want to add?
6	MR. MARION: Just so Your Honor is clear, the County
7	and Mr. Pelly under the federal regulations have an
8	obligation for noise abatement to the community and the
9	surrounding neighborhood of the airport.
10	He does direct that. He does have influence over
11	whether to go to the FAA and say these are safe fanning
12	flight tracks, is that okay with you. He can go to them
13	and say I have chosen these three or four fanning flight
14	tracts, is that okay with you. Is it safe, yes, then
15	send them there.
16	He has direct influence over that. I just want Your
17	Honor to be clear on that, the County has direct
18	influence over that.
19	THE COURT: Suppose Mr. Pelly didn't think it was
20	safe?
21	MR. MARION: Then why I mean, if they used to fan
22	and the FAA said it's safe, that's absurd.
23	He could say that.
24	THE COURT: They used to fan when?
25	MR. MARION: I'm sorry?

1	THE COURT: They used to fan when?
2	MR. MARION: In the past. They fanned in the past.
3	They have stopped fanning, and now all of the flights are
4	going over Mar-A-Largo.
5	THE COURT: Is that as a result of any conditions
6	that have changed, number of flights that are leaving and
7	taking off now or any other condition?
8	MR. MARION: In fact, the more flights there are,
9	Your Honor, the more reason there is for fanning because
10	you can send them off sooner.
11	You can send them off and they fan off to the north.
12	You send one off over Mar-A-Largo, and you send one off
13	to the south. That's the reason for fanning. The more
14	increased traffic, the more reason there is for fanning.
15	So all of that is in the control of the County and
16	Mr. Pelly. I don't want you to be misled, they have a
17	lot of influence over flight tracks. The FAA listens to
18	the County airport operator very carefully. We just need
19	to be able to take these people's depositions.
20	THE COURT: Is there anything stopping you from
21	taking the depositions?
22	MR. MARION: We want to get past this phase, Your
23	Honor, make sure you know, make sure that we got
24	THE COURT: How long has this been filed?
25	MR. MARION: It was filed a year ago.

- 1 THE COURT: More than a year ago.
- 2 MR. MARION: It was in January.
- 3 THE COURT: January?
- 4 MR. MARION: Yes. There was a motion to dismiss.
- 5 There was an amendment to the pleadings, then there was a
- 6 second motion to dismiss.
- We're trying to get past the pleading stage. We
- 8 have engaged in discovery.
- 9 THE COURT: I mean, there is nothing that prevents
- 10 you from taking discovery.
- 11 MR. MARION: No. There is nothing to prevent us,
- 12 Your Honor.
- 13 THE COURT: Okay.
- MR. MARION: We have been doing some investigation
- behind the scenes, I promise you.
- 16 THE COURT: I'm sure that you have.
- 17 MR. ROGOW: Paragraph eight of the agreement is the
- 18 point. That's where fanning shows up in paragraph eight,
- 19 support the fanning.
- 20 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
- 21 Sir, I will give you the last word.
- 22 MR. PILSK: Thank you, Your Honor. I will try to be
- 23 brief. I know you have given us an hour generally of
- 24 your time.
- 25 THE COURT: It's interesting issues so go on.

MR. PILSK: Well, thank you.
The first point I want to make is that from
everything that plaintiffs have said is they really don't
need Mr. Pelly for either claims. They repeatedly
described him as an agent of the County, as an employee
of the County.
If anything they said is true, you know, we
obviously deny, but they can get all the relief they need
by simply naming the County as a defendant and not Mr.
Pelly. He adds nothing to it.
In a sense it turns the idea of the response of a
superior on its head by saying we rather have the
inferior employee present to be responsible for the
action of the principle instead of the other way around.
They can get all the relief that they need, if
they're entitled to anything, from the County without
including Mr. Pelly.
THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Going back to the
agreement, does paragraph eight impose any obligations on
the County?
MR. PILSK: No.
THE COURT: None?
MR. PILSK: Just to support the fanning of Stage 2
aircraft. That's an important distinction.
THE COURT: There is an obligation then to support

1	fanning to some degree, right?
2	MR. PILSK: Let's look at the language if you don't
3	mind, Your Honor. Shall continue to support the fanning
4	of Stage 2 aircraft under the procedures set forth in the
5	NCP update for PBIA approved by the FAA 1995 until an
6	update is superceded.
7	THE COURT: The argument is that they have breached
8	that agreement or the County breached that agreement by
9	doing just the opposite, not supporting it but in fact
10	discouraging it.
11	If that were the case, would that be a breach of the
12	agreement?
13	MR. PILSK: If they were discouraging the fanning of
14	Stage 2 aircraft, that could be a breach of the
15	agreement.
16	THE COURT: Isn't that what they have alleged?
17	MR. PILSK: No, they haven't.
18	Actually, the word Stage 2 hardly appears in the
19	complaint and that isn't what they have alleged at all.
20	Moreover, as a matter of law
21	THE COURT: What is Stage 2?
22	MR. PILSK: I just was getting to that. So aircraft
23	have been classified over the years in different stages.
24	They relate roughly speaking to the noise levels on
25	a weight basis. So a bigger aircraft may be rated Stage

1, which is the older, the noisiest class of aircraft. 1 They are no more. Stage 2 were slightly more modern, slightly less 3 noisy. Now, we have Stage 3, which is really what all the aircraft are today and some Stage 4. This is the 5 point. 6 7 In 1990 Congress passed a law, The Airport Noise and Capacity Act that phased out all Stage 2 aircraft over 8 9 75,000 pounds over the '90s so that by January -- excuse me, December 31, 1989 that fleet was phased out. 10 are no more commercial Stage 2 aircraft at all. 11 12 Subsequently, and I don't have the cite at the tip of my tongue, the lighter, below 75,000 pound Stage 2 13 aircraft, have also been phased out. There really aren't 14 any Stage 2 aircraft anymore. 15 16 That whole point is moot. All the aircraft taking 17 off from Palm Beach, and certainly all the larger commercial aircraft, are Stage 3 aircraft or Stage 4. 18 THE COURT: So your position in a nutshell in regard 19 to paragraph eight, to the extent that the County had any 20 obligation at all to support fanning, was only in regard 21 to these Stage 2 aircraft. 22 23 They have no obligations under the agreement as it relates to the newer models of the Stage 3 aircraft. 24 25 They can direct every single one of them over Mar-A-Largo

if they want, it wouldn't be a violation of paragraph 1 2 eight. Is that your position? 3 MR. PILSK: That's correct. Furthermore, and this gets to the point if you go 5 back to the whereas clause which talks generally about 6 7 the procedures it says very clearly the current preferred flight track, and this is the FAA's preferred flight 8 9 track, the FAA's order calls for departing and arriving transport category aircraft using PBIA runway 9 left, 27 10 right to fly the runway extended center line which is 11 approximately 1,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo. 12 No fanning for those aircraft, straight out or... 13 THE COURT: Where are you reading from again? 14 MR. PILSK: This is the whereas clause on page five 15 16 of the settlement agreement. 17 THE COURT: Continue again, I'm sorry. MR. PILSK: So my point is that the procedure since 18 at least 1995 and before from the FAA, not from the 19 County, the procedure that the FAA implemented was not to 20 That has been their procedure for decades. 21 22 It wasn't changed by the County. When the County 23 did their noise compatibility program, again it's reflected in the whereas clauses --24 THE COURT: Was that an issue of fact whether it was 25

or was not changed by the County? I mean, essentially 1 2 that's what the plaintiff's argument is, give us a chance, let's us show this. 3 MR. PILSK: Again, the whereas clause that is attached to their complaint makes it clear that first of 5 all, the FAA's order preexisted any recommendations by 6 the County. This was the FAA's decision not to fan. 7 This happened 20 years ago. 8 I mean, I don't even know if there is a statute of 9 limitations that would bar it. They have not said 10 anything in the complaint about when this happened. 11 Furthermore, the County's recommendation resulted in 12 a legislative decision about the noise abatement 13 procedures to follow which included using the runway 14 15 heading procedure instead of fanning, which again is acknowledged in the whereas clauses that while Mr. Trump 16 17 had opposed the no fanning at the time, that wasn't what the County went with. 18 So now we're just trying to reargue debates that 19 were won and lost over 20 years ago. Is that what the 20 case is about? You know, that seems to me what they're 21 22 saying. This is re-fighting battles that had been won and 23 lost decades go under the skies of this influence which 24 again they keep saying influence, but it's all buzz 25

words.

There are no facts. There are no specifics. There
is no indication of what authority any airport director
could possibly have over FAA air traffic controllers
other than whispering in their ears. There is no
allegation that he ever whispered in anyone's ear.

It really is just bare bones surmise. Airplanes are flying over Mar-A-Largo, there must be some evil reason for it, give us our relief. That's their claim as it stands now with no facts to connect the dots between the aircraft actually flying and the FAA directing the aircraft and any action by any County employee including the airport director.

It's simply insufficient on its face and it should be dismissed. The fact is the suit is a continuation of a lawsuit that was settled in 1995 which raised very similar claims. It filed a very similar suit again in 2010.

It was initially dismissed by Judge Marx. They amended the complaint, refiled it, dismissed it voluntarily after a hearing on a motion to dismiss in 2011. Now, three or four years later they come back and file the same things.

Every time they trim the case down, make the
allegations vaguer and vaguer. This isn't a game. We're

talking about serious allegations against long-serving
public employees.

It cost public money to defend these claims and for what, so they can amend and make the claims even vaguer again. I think we're at a point, Your Honor, where enough is enough. If they get a right to amend I understand that's their right, but it ought to be with clear direction to allege facts that could possibly support their claim and not bald conclusions.

10 Thank you.

11 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MS. PETRICK: Your Honor, if I may just offer the Court because you asked the question about is it a question of fact. I just wanted to call to your attention that in the amended complaint on page five, paragraph 18, plaintiffs acknowledge that only Stage 3 operate from Palm Beach International Airport at this point.

Stage 2 have been phased out as a matter of federal law. The other citation that I would like to call to Your Honor's attention is on page seven of the amended complaint, and that is at paragraph 31. That substantive paragraph used to stay that fanning was the appropriate customary procedure.

It was changed after the County's initial motion to

1 dismiss. And what it now says is that the normal and customary procedure of the departures at PBIA is to have the airplanes depart using routes north of Mar-A-Largo, 3 not fanning. They have dropped the allegations of fanning in 5 response to our initial motion to dismiss as a matter of 6 7 their pleading. What has been said today is inconsistent with what the pleadings actually reflect. 8 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I know I said you would have the last word, but I do want to go back to Mr. 10 Rogow just a second and I do want to address that issue, 11 12 the issue regarding the agreement again. So if I understand the County's argument, clearly is 13 paragraph eight really is not applicable in this instance 14 because paragraph eight only applies to Stage 2. 15 The difficulty is that paragraph eight 16 MR. ROGOW: was responsive to what was in existence at that time. 17 So it is true that the times have changed with regard to 18 supporting fanning with regard to Stage 2 aircraft. 19 So literally the County is correct that there is not 20 Stage 2 aircraft now. Although, these are factual issues 21 22 it seems to me that need to be ironed out so the Court would have a real basis for making this decision. 23 THE COURT: I thought it was just argued to me that 24 in your very own complaint you acknowledge that there are 25

1 no Stage 2 flights anymore? 2 MR. ROGOW: You know, we have said that there are no I don't know that for a fact that there 3 Stage 2 flights. are no Stage 2 flights. I mean, I think Mr. Marion -- are there no Stage 2 5 flights anymore? 6 7 MR. MARION: I don't believe there are, Your Honor, any Stage 2, but important to the settlement agreement is 8 9 that the County agreed to the preferred flight tracks, to maximum adherence to the preferred flight tracks. 10 If you look at the settlement agreement it defines 11 12 those as being -- so if you want to read it literally, more than 4,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo is where 13 they're going to adhere to and they're not doing that. 14 THE COURT: I thought I just heard the agreement says 15 16 it goes right over Mar-A-Largo? 17 MR. MARION: No. All you have to do is read the agreement, Your Honor, and you will see. 18 MR. PILSK: The 4,000 foot refers to the Stage 2 19 20 It says Stage 2 only in parenthesis very clearly. 21 22 The other non-Stage 2 flight tracks are runways 23 heading out which is about 1,000 feet north of Mar-A-Largo. 24

THE COURT:

25

I find that where again?

1 MR. PILSK: In that same whereas clause on page five 2 of the settlement agreement. THE COURT: I will take a look at that. 3 I appreciate all of your arguments. Okav. didn't disappoint me. It was a very good argument. 5 Ι appreciate it. There are some very interesting issues. 6 Whatever I do in this case I feel I want to write 7 about it a little bit and you will have the benefit of my 8 feelings and my reasoning. Hopefully I won't be too much longer. It shouldn't 10 take me long to get something, but if a long period of 11 12 time goes by, and by that I mean if in three weeks or so you don't have something from me, I hope it would be 13 shorter than that, I will take no offense to you calling 14 my office and ask where it is. 15 Sometimes things fall through the cracks. 16 I don't 17 think this will be one of them, but it does happen on occasion. So like I said, I take no offense if you want 18 to know where things are and when you might be expecting 19 an order. 20 Anything else that I can help you with today? 21 22 MR. PILSK: We do have forms orders, which it sounds like you don't need, but we also have envelopes if Your 23 Honor would like. 24 THE COURT: I'll take the envelopes anyway. 25 We'll

1	save the court a few dollars.
2	Okay. Thank you.
3	(Thereupon, the hearing was concluded.)
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	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Fage 1 01 14
\$	55:16	abuse 14:25	17:6,12
\$100 4:6	300 2:12	accordance 10:14	affecting 17:9
	31 51:10 55:22	Accordingly 5:15	afford 23:7
1	33394 2:8	achieve 5:22 6:1	against
1 51:1 60:10	-	8:17 9:6,16,24	5:3,12,16,19,20
1,000 11:15,18	33401 2:5,13	13:23 31:9 45:2	7:10 13:24
12:11 20:15		achieving 40:1	15:12 21:14
52:12 57:23	<u>4</u>	acknowledge	42:20 55:1
10 6:6,11,19	4 51:5,18	6:12,13 55:16	agencies 5:13
8:24 9:4 40:22	4,000 57:13,19	56:25	agent 28:24 41:5
10:08 1:23		acknowledged	49:5
1001 2:15	5	53:16	agents 13:4
10-A 9:10	500 2:7 19:5	acknowledges	aggressive 9:21
10-B 2:21	502015CA000086XX XXMB 1:4	11:19	ago 6:25 9:23
15 40:22		Act 51:8	12:9 24:17,21
150 11:10	59 60:10	action 8:7 10:17	47:25 48:1
		15:12 22:14	53:8,20
18 24:9 55:16	7	23:3 24:22 30:16 31:7,13	agreed 57:9
1930 2:7	75,000 51:9,13	32:23 37:6	agreement 5:25
1989 51:10	7th 60:19	38:2,4 42:3	6:11 7:2,4 8:9,12,13,16,17
1990 51:7		49:14 54:12	,19 11:1,8
1995 50:5 52:19	8	60:15	24:17
54:16	8:59 1:23	actions 6:22,23	27:6,7,8,9,17
<u></u>	800 2:15	9:19,23 25:19	28:18,20 29:15 30:11 32:16
2	811 2:5	31:23,25 37:15,17 41:14	35:10 41:12
2 1:22 29:13	85 5:24	activities 21:4	45:25 48:17
49:23 50:4,14,18,21			49:19
51:3,8,11,13,15	9	acts 31:17 42:17	50:8,12,15 51:23 52:16
,22 55:19	9 52:10	actually 7:16 43:8 50:18	56:12
56:15,19,21	90s 51:9	54:11 56:8	57:8,11,15,18
57:1,3,4,5,8,19 ,20,22		add 32:18 46:5	58:2
		address 5:5	ahead 6:9 42:22
20 12:8 24:17,20,21	a.m 1:23	23:22 25:14	aimed 43:3
53:8,20	AA 1:4	34:7 56:11	air 4:10 10:22
20036 2:15	abate 16:8,11	adds 49:10	12:19 13:2,3,9
2010 54:18	22:22 39:19	adhere 7:18 32:2	14:9,12,21,23
2010 54:18 2011 54:22	abatement 35:2	57:14	23:8,17,21 33:16,17,24
	39:17 40:3 46:8	adherence 5:22	34:11 54:4
2015 1:22 2:23 60:19	53:13	6:2,5,16,20	aircraft 3:24
	abateness 26:1	7:18,22 8:18,21	4:11,12 6:18
205 2:21	abide 32:22	9:5,6,11,16,25 10:5 12:4 27:22	11:14,22,24
220 19:2 20:11,14	ability 23:11	28:2 30:5 43:19	12:9,12,23 13:14,16
	able 31:9,13	57:10	14:14,10
250 19:5	41:18 47:19	adjacent 16:1	15:4,6,13 17:7
27 52:10	above-styled	37:10	18:4,13 22:23
2nd 2:23	2:19	administrative	24:8 29:13 35:5 39:23,24,25
	absolutely 4:9	36:20	40:5,8,19 49:24
3	absurd 46:22	advocate 13:22	50:4,14,22,25
3 51:4,18,24	-	affected 15:24	51:1,5,8,11,14,

			rage 2 OI 14
15,16,18,22,24	30:10 41:4	apply 60:16	attached 6:7
52:10,13 54:11,12	alleging 31:16	appreciate	11:1 53:5
56:19,21	allocate 24:11	58:4,6	attack 4:13
airlines 6:17	allocation 25:3	<pre>appropriate 55:23</pre>	attempt 6:20 8:17
airmen 9:22	allow 12:5 27:23	approve 35:6	attention
airplanes 19:9	alone 4:18 14:19	approved 34:18	55:15,21
25:16 44:19 54:7 56:3	already 27:24	50:5	attorney 2:11
airport	altitude 22:4	approximately	60:13,14
4:5,9,19,20	am 21:10	12:10 52:12	attributes 16:23 17:3,5
10:13,21 11:6	60:12,13,14	area 24:24 39:16 41:1	authority
12:16,21 13:1 15:12 18:17,23	amend 55:4,6	aren't 8:6 17:5	6:13,14 23:4
21:14 24:13	amended 3:22 5:23 6:6,7	42:13 51:14	54:3
25:17 26:10,11 27:1 28:5,21	54:20 55:15,21	argue 28:17	authorized 60:8
31:9 32:11	amendment 48:5	argued 31:1	Avenue 2:5,15
34:5,17,18,25 35:1	among 13:21	56:24	Aviation 19:4
39:1,2,5,6,7,9,	40:20	argues 19:8	20:25
11,15,18,24	amount 36:5 40:14	arguing 10:21	avoid 20:9
40:21 41:22,23 42:14,15,18		33:1	В
44:16 46:9	Amy 2:12 3:11	<pre>argument 10:12 22:8 28:10,13</pre>	BACHI 2:3
47:18 51:7	and/or 60:17	29:4 31:4,20	balance 24:15
54:3,13 55:17	answer 29:17 37:8 40:23	32:6,13,25	balancing 24:13
airports 15:5,13	44:10	33:10 34:11 35:14 41:20	25:2
airspace 14:8,9 15:2,14	antithesis 30:8	50:7 53:2 56:13	bald 55:9
18:5,13,18	anymore 35:9	58:5	bar 21:19 53:10
19:1,5 20:10,17,18,19	51:15 57:1,6	arguments 24:21 26:1 58:4	bare 36:5 54:7
21:21 22:1,10	anyone's 54:6	arriving 4:19	barred 24:2 25:5
allegation	anything 6:3 9:17 10:4 14:19	11:22 52:9	based 26:23
7:6,23,25 8:4 14:3,23 20:5,9	19:20 34:2 46:5	ash 19:24	basic 22:20
26:12,23 30:6	47:20 49:7,16	aside 26:4	basically 6:24
54:6	53:11 58:21	aspects 24:4,10	9:22 44:8
allegations 4:17	anyway 58:25 anywhere 35:9,12	aspirational	basis 7:10 14:18 50:25 56:23
20:11 16:17	anywhere 35:9,12 apart 14:5	9:2,3 29:21	battles 53:23
31:5 36:3	apologize 22:3	assert 5:18 7:10	Beach 1:3,10
38:9,14 54:25 55:1 56:5	apparently 19:15	asserted 5:2 7:17	2:5,13,20,22
allege 7:4,9	27:13	assertion 12:22	3:1 4:4 21:6,12 23:16 36:19
16:17 18:12	appearances 3:5	13:1 35:11	39:24 51:17
21:23 38:21 55:8	APPEARING 2:2,10	assist 35:8	55:17 60:5
alleged 3:23 8:3	appears 50:18	assistance 43:10	beginning 32:19 37:16 45:25
16:18 17:12	appellate 21:13	assume 31:4	behalf 2:2,10
19:18,19 35:24 36:14	applicable 56:14	42:23 45:8	5:10
38:2,10,20	application	assuming 28:22 42:19	behind 48:15
44:23 50:16,19	18:16	atmospheric	believe 3:18
alleges 5:21	applies 56:15	15:22 17:8	34:6 35:24 57:7

21:5 22:2 24:6 beneficial 18:4 citation 55:20 commercial 27:3,5 29:20 51:11,18 benefit 58:8 cite 15:19 17:20 31:14 32:12,18 36:18 51:12 common 5:9 10:8 benefits 33:11 34:4 24:13,15 25:2 cited 3:15 15:11 communicated 36:17,18 21:12 26:19 37:14,21 38:5 Benitez 19:4 39:21 41:16,25 citizens 35:1 community 40:20 Bertsch 2:4 3:8 42:1,10,22 46:8 City 2:21 17:19 44:13 beyond 24:4 19:7 41:24 compatibility 45:13,20,22,24 36:2,4,13 11:11 52:23 50:11 53:21 claim 4:9 bigger 50:25 54:24 58:7 5:8,12,15,19,20 compel 4:10 bit 26:3 58:8 ,21 10:22 13:2 cases 15:9 20:25 7:9,13,16,17 bones 54:7 25:13 30:17 compensable 8:3 10:18,25 39:18 20:21 Boulevard 2:7 11:7 14:5 42:6,13,14 complain 32:7 15:1,15 16:4 branch 23:25 category 11:21 25:4 21:11 complaint 3:22 52:10 22:13,15,17 5:24 6:6,7 10:2 branches 23:24 25:17 30:14,23 cause 2:19 22:14 11:2,3 12:16 breach 4:1 34:6 36:24,25 31:11,13 37:6 14:6,23 16:22 5:7,20,21 41:15,22,23 38:2,4 42:3 21:13,15,23 7:9,16 42:13 46:2 54:9 26:3,9 30:9 caused 19:12 29:3,6,7,8,9,19 55:9 31:6,24 21:2 31:25 32:1 30:13,14 42:4 36:2,10,14 37:6 **claims** 3:23,25 38:1 41:5 44:15 50:11,14 41:2,4,7 42:2 4:2,3,15,25 **causes** 11:21 44:7 50:19 breached 8:4 5:2,5,9 53:5,11 54:20 28:18 50:7,8 causing 18:5 10:2,7,9,13 55:15,22 56:25 20:6 23:15 24:2 49:4 break 5:3 54:17 55:3,4 complete 40:4 ceiling 19:13 brief 15:8 18:14 clams 5:2 compliance 8:2 19:8 42:8 48:23 center 52:11 **class** 51:1 complicit 13:21 broad 16:2 certain 6:21 classic 25:16 21:3 45:7 complying 26:14 brought 36:21 classified 50:23 certainly 8:23 concede 12:23 Broward 2:7 38:18,19 39:15 **clause** 11:5,9 concentrate 24:6 Bruce 1:11 2:6,7 51:17 52:6,15 53:4 30:21 40:25 3:7 34:19 **CERTIFICATE** 60:2 58:1 concept 39:20,22 building 21:3 certification clauses 52:24 **burdens** 24:23 concern 39:17 60:16 53:16 concerned 21:10 business 3:4 **certify** 60:8,12 **clear** 5:10 7:12 36:3 10:12,16,20 **buzz** 53:25 chance 53:3 13:19 15:21 conclude 14:18 change 44:4 24:1,16 45:3 concluded 59:3 С 46:6,17 53:5 changed 12:18 cane 36:19 55:8 conclusion 16:2 47:6 52:22 53:1 55:25 56:18 capability 6:15 conclusions 55:9 clearly 20:18 22:24 37:6 52:7 Capacity 51:8 changes 23:2,8 conclusory 56:13 57:21 45:8 13:1,20 14:3 care 34:12,14 **close** 8:7 9:21 36:11 37:2 37:24 40:18 **charge** 23:17 11:24 33:3 condemnation carefully 47:18 **clothes** 19:10 3:25 5:7,12,15 children 21:2 carrying 28:19 17:18,22 **Club** 1:6 8:20 chosen 46:13 18:1,17,22 case 1:4 3:15 12:2 28:1,11,14 19:16 circuit 1:2 15:11,20,25 comes 23:14 21:10,11,14,19 17:19 18:15 23:16 24:20 26:5 22:8,13 30:23 19:2,7 20:11

			rage 4 OI 14
37:8 41:24 42:4	conversations	55:25 56:13	damage 21:3
condition 47:7	21:16	course 39:2	41:17,21 42:18
conditions 47:5	cooking 19:11	41:19	damaged 21:3
conduct 9:20	cooperation	court 1:2 2:25	damages 4:7 38:1
Congress 51:7	43:10	3:4,9,12 6:9 7:1,14	DATE 1:22
connect 54:10	copy 6:8	8:6,15,25 10:6	Dated 60:19
Connecticut 2:15	core 10:10	13:19 15:20 16:21 17:18,23	day 60:19
consequence	corners 8:11 10:1 11:3	18:19 19:4,7	deal 5:8 34:20
44:24	corporation 1:6	20:1,13,22	dealing 15:21
consequences	correct 3:1,2	21:5,9,13 22:1,6,19	28:5
43:1	8:24 18:19	23:5,7,16,24	debates 53:19
considered 18:15	28:16 52:4	25:9,11,22,25	decades 52:21
conspiracy 13:21	56:20	26:15 27:11,25 28:6,9,17,22	53:24
construct 37:17	cost 55:3	29:5,21,24	December 51:10
context 10:25	counsel 60:13	30:18,20,25 31:20 32:13,24	decide 39:23
11:7 18:17,23 28:4	counter-factual	33:9,21 34:9	decided 45:19
continuation	counts 22:18	35:11,16,18,21	decides 35:4
54:15	43:8 46:3,4	36:1,9,22 37:1,11 38:6,25	decision 23:20,23 24:18
continue	County 1:3,10	39:4	33:14 53:7,13
29:13,16 50:3	2:11,20,22	40:4,7,11,13	56:23
52:17	3:1,21 4:16 6:12,14,21,24	42:6 43:6 44:1,11	decisions
continued 29:18	7:5,14,17,23	46:5,19,24	33:4,17,18
contract 4:1 5:8,20,22	8:4,7,11,13,19	47:1,5,20,24 48:1,3,9,13,16,	decrease 19:14
7:11,16,20 8:5	9:1,13,19 10:3 12:2,7 13:4	20,25	defend 25:1 55:3
9:14 25:21	14:11 19:4	49:18,22,25	defendant 2:10 3:10 49:9
29:4,6,7,8,9,10 ,19 30:13,14	20:25 21:6,12	50:7,16,21 51:19	
32:22 33:12	23:4,16 24:17,19 26:6	52:14,17,25	defendants 1:12 5:3,5
40:2 42:4 45:14	27:18,19,21,25	55:11,13	defense 33:13
contrary 7:8	28:4,11,14,23,2 5	56:9,22,24 57:15,25	defenses 10:8
23:19	29:2,3,12,16,18	58:3,25 59:1	defines 57:11
control 4:19 12:7,20 14:7,9	,21,25 30:3,21	Courthouse 2:21	degree 16:19,21
15:3,5 22:25	32:16,21 33:1,2,5,19	Courts 36:16	17:16 50:1
23:8,11 26:11,12 33:6	34:16,25 35:17	covered 22:7	degrees 17:10
43:24,25 45:4	36:19 39:16 41:5 42:20	covers 19:9 25:7	Delaware 1:6
47:15 60:17	43:4,9,17	cracked 19:12	deliberate 37:3
controller 13:9	44:17,21	cracks 58:16	38:19
14:10	45:1,14 46:6,17 47:15,18	current 11:18	deliberately 33:25
controllers 4:11,18 10:22	49:5,6,9,16,20	52:7	
13:3,4 14:25	50:8 51:20 52:20,22	currently 11:14	demonstrate 6:1
26:20 33:17,24 54:4	53:1,7,18 54:12	customary 10:14	deny 4:17 49:8
controller's	56:20 57:9 60:5	12:15 55:24 56:2	depart 15:5 56:3
14:13,21,24	County's 3:19		departed 12:10
33:18	6:14 7:15 12:6 28:20 36:15	D	departing 4:19 11:22 14:14
controlling 45:4	40:2 53:12	D.C 2:15	52:9

departure 4:4,12 7:19 9:21 10:5,23
departures 56:2
depositions 47:19,21
depravation 18:3,8,24
described 49:5
designed 4:16
detail 18:16
detailing 16:23
details 22:10
deterioration 20:6
determination 24:12
develop 11:11
development 11:9
deviate 4:11 10:23
deviated 12:12
difference 20:14 38:7 39:21
differences 16:19,21
different 5:6 16:19 17:10,15,16 19:17 24:14 39:11,14 41:19 45:21 50:23
difficult 21:17
difficulty 56:16
diminish 31:11
diminution 18:21 19:1
direct 4:11 18:5 23:21 31:9 33:25 44:6 46:10,16,17 51:25 60:17
directed 33:19 37:4 38:14,22 41:21
directing 38:18 40:16 54:11
direction 55:8 60:18

directly 4:13

11:25 18:24 31:18 32:4 34:1,22 37:23 38:23 42:24 43:15 45:6 director 4:10,21
10:21 12:21 13:1 26:10 39:5,7 42:18 54:3,13
directorship 27:1
disappoint 58:5
discomfort 32:10 40:20 44:15
discontinue 30:12
discourage 30:9 43:19
discouraged 30:8,10,11 41:12
discouraging 50:10,13
discovery 48:8,10
discretion 14:25 discussed 27:24
discussion
20:4,7 dismiss 3:22
4:23 5:17 7:13 11:4 14:4 22:17 33:7 38:9 48:4,6 54:21 56:1,6
dismissal 21:13
dismissed 5:17 42:2 54:15,19,20
displeasure 19:22
dispute 5:11
distance 15:23
distinction 49:24
distinguish 15:9
distract 20:22 distributed
19:24
disturbed 42:15

	Page 5 of 1
disturbing 25:17	35:9,12 58:21
Dixie 2:12,21	e-mail 33:23
doctrine 23:20 24:3 25:6	<pre>eminent 5:14 emissions 17:6</pre>
documents 7:7	employee 27:18
dollars 59:1	29:3 31:9
domain 5:14	49:5,13 54:12 60:12,14
done 3:13 8:1 30:7 38:20	employees 5:12 55:2
dots 54:10	encourage 6:20
draw 16:2	7:22 8:20 9:5
dropped 56:5	10:5 12:3 27:2 29:18 30:4
dry 19:11	encouraging 8:2
due 11:20 12:11 13:17 26:21	30:9 41:13
dump 16:2	<pre>enforce 6:15 8:21 12:3,7</pre>
duties 29:24	16:7 27:22 28:
30:2	enforcement 6:1
E	enforces 11:17
ear 54:6	engaged 48:8
earlier 12:1	enjoin 42:21
early 12:8	enjoyment 31:12
ears 54:5	enrich 4:6
east 26:21	entire 13:10
32:4,11 34:23	entirely 37:2
37:23 42:24 43:15	entitled 49:16
effect 8:1 15:22	enumerated 29:2
17:1,8 22:22	envelopes 58:23,25
24:23 31:15,21 effective 24:14	Eric 2:14 3:10
effectively 12:23	ESQUIRE 2:4,7,12,14
effects 23:8,10	essentially
efficient 5:4	35:14 53:1
effort 6:19	evaluation 24:7
efforts 26:14	<pre>everybody 3:5 15:24 32:7,9</pre>
eight 9:12 29:12 30:1 41:11	everyone 17:9
30:1 41:11 48:17,18 49:19 51:20 52:2 56:14,15,16	<pre>everything 3:18 9:24 10:3 14:1 19:9 49:3</pre>

either 14:14 18:3 49:4

elements 37:7

elevate 24:18

else 17:12

			_
except 31:15	57:3	fell 29:5	52:11
42:25	factor 15:18	FIFTEENTH 1:2	flying 3:24
exclusive	factors 12:12	fights 14:16	11:24 14:20,21
14:7,8,9 15:3	13:18 24:3	_	20:9 22:23
22:25		file 54:23	25:16 31:10
excuse 5:21 19:6	facts 12:25	filed 47:24,25	38:23 40:5,8
51:9	13:13 54:2,10 55:8	54:17	41:8 43:23
exercised 13:6,8		final 22:15	44:25 54:8,11
-	factual 36:4	Finally 15:17	focus 32:16
exercising 31:21	56:21	_	focused 31:2
exhibit 6:7 11:2	failed 7:17,23	financially 60:15	32:20 37:14
existence 56:17	22:9 30:12		focuses 18:14
expecting 58:19	32:22 41:13	fine 18:10 20:24	32:23
- -	fails 22:13	34:24 43:13	foot 57:19
expired 6:25	failure 5:22	first 3:4,22	
explain 13:15	33:8 41:18	5:4,10 9:5 11:7	foreclosed 36:7
extended 52:11	fair 40:19	14:6 19:19 21:20 27:7 49:2	foregoing 60:10
extent 31:16	fall 58:16	53:5	forms 58:22
51:20	falls 20:3	five 52:15 55:15	Fort 2:8 39:18
		58:1	45:12
F	false 4:9		forth 9:7,13
F.P.R 60:22	family 21:16	fleet 51:10	29:14,25 50:4
FAA 4:10,18 6:17	fan 19:12 35:1	flight 5:23	forward 23:14
8:20 9:20 10:22	39:23 43:2	6:2,3,15,21 7:18,22	Foster 17:19
11:16,17 12:3	46:21,24	8:2,18,21	19:2 20:10,13
13:2,3	47:1,11 52:21	9:12,16	41:16,24
14:6,12,15,21	53:7	11:6,9,18,20,23	
15:5 23:2,11,17	fanned 32:5,6,8	12:4,7,9 13:11	frame 31:8
26:6 27:22 28:1	47:2	23:1,2,10,11	frankly 4:15
31:15,16,21,25	fanning	26:11,20,25	5:17 12:21 23:4
32:2,8,14,17	26:17,18,20	27:23 28:2	frightened 21:1
33:2,6,14,16	29:13,16	34:14,16 39:12	•
34:12,18,20,21, 23 35:6,15	30:4,12 32:2	46:12,13 47:17	front 21:8 22:4
37:22 38:22,23	35:22	52:8 57:9,10,22	fulfill 9:8
39:2,10 42:23	40:10,23,24	flights 8:7	fumes 41:1
43:2,10,12	41:12 42:21	19:2,12 20:11	functioning 18:9
44:3,6,8,9,12,1	43:4,12,18,21	21:15,16 26:17	-
4	44:14,21 45:7	34:22 35:20	fundamentally
45:4,5,9,13,17	46:1,2,11,13 47:3,9,13,14	47:3,6,8	16:18 23:10,23
46:11,22 47:17	48:18,19 49:23	57:1,3,4,6	Furthermore 52:5
50:5 52:19,20	50:1,3,13 51:21	Floor 2:12	53:12
54:4,11	52:13 53:15,17	Florida	
FAA's 39:12	55:23 56:4,5,19	1:3,10,11	G
44:18,21 52:8,9	federal 14:7	2:5,8,13,22	Gainesville
53:6,7	22:25 23:1,3,18	13:19 18:1	17:19 19:7
face 10:1 54:14	26:7 34:21	20:20 60:4,7	41:16,25
faced 31:6	39:10 46:7	Flo-Sun 13:19	game 54:25
fact 4:24 7:6	55:19	36:17	gardening 19:11
10:3 11:16	feel 3:17 58:7	fly 4:12 8:7	general 3:23
14:19 15:11	feelings 58:9	10:23 33:25	18:16 19:21
18:14 20:13	feet 11:15,18	34:22	39:20 41:22
24:16 31:2,3	12:11 19:3,5	35:8,9,11,12,13 37:18,22	42:15
47:8 50:9 52:25	20:14,15 52:12	40:11,16 42:23	generally 20:3
54:15 55:14	57:13,23	40.11,10 42.23	36:10 48:23
	·	<u> </u>	30110 40123

52:6	heard 25:1 57:15	38:6,8,12 43:6	47:17 53:24,25
gets 52:5	hearing 21:2	44:11 46:25 48:16 52:17	influenced 13:7
getting 39:12	36:1,13 54:21 59:3	48:16 52:17 immediate 18:6	26:25 33:18
50:22	heart 29:20	impact 16:10	influences 37:1
gist 12:16	31:23 44:22	20:4,20 32:3	<pre>influencing 25:19</pre>
given 34:5 48:23	45:13	impacts 4:5 16:1	information
government 14:7 22:25 23:1,3	heightened 14:1	19:20 24:13,15 25:3	26:24 34:4,5
26:7 39:10	help 58:21	impairing 20:7	initial 25:7
Governor 36:21	hereby 60:8	implemented	55:25 56:6
grant 43:10	he's 27:12	52:20	initially 54:19
granted 43:7	high 20:18	important 16:14	injunction 16:8 22:22 24:2
44:1	Highway 2:12,21	29:15 30:15 49:24 57:8	42:20 43:3,17
great 34:19	Hillsborough 19:3 20:25	impose 8:25	injunctive 4:1
greatest 6:20	hinges 20:13	49:19	22:16 25:5 42:8 43:8 44:2
ground 19:6 24:5	history 11:6	impossible 21:4	injured 3:24
guess 31:8 39:5 43:6	12:17 13:16	improper 14:24	injury 15:18,23
guise 4:3 24:22	hold 26:6	included 53:14	16:3,15
gun 33:21	homes 19:13	including 11:23	instance 34:19
	homework 3:13	15:2 49:17 54:12	56:14
<u> </u>	Honor 3:20 6:8 7:12 12:2 17:21	inconsistent	<pre>instead 7:25 13:15 26:14</pre>
hand 34:3 39:9,10,23	21:7 22:3,20	56:7	49:14 53:15
hands 14:14	25:7 28:8 31:2	increased 47:14	instructions
hanging 19:10	35:25 36:17 38:3 46:6,17	incremental	12:20 14:13,15,22,24
happen 37:4	47:9,23	33:12	insufficient
58:17	48:12,22 50:3 55:5,12 57:7,18	<pre>indeed 30:8 37:18</pre>	54:14
happened 41:3	58:24	indicated 38:13	intent 8:17
53:8,11	Honorable 1:18	indication 19:23	interest
happens 14:13 43:22	2:20	54:3	39:12,14
harass 4:16	Honor's 37:8 55:21	indispensable	interested 60:15
hardly 50:18	hoot 34:13	32:24,25 33:8	<pre>interesting 48:25 58:6</pre>
harm 13:24 16:17	hope 34:3 45:3	<pre>individual 5:12,19 13:8,24</pre>	interests 39:11
31:11	58:13	individually	interfere 31:12
harmed 22:11	Hopefully 58:10	1:11	43:4 45:17
42:17 harms 25:2	hour 48:23	inferior 49:13	interfered
		inflict 13:23	44:23,24
hate 34:10	<u> </u>	influence	<pre>interference 18:6 19:22</pre>
haven't 17:12 19:19 33:7,9	identified 10:4	4:10,21 10:11,22 12:20	21:24 22:12
50:17	ignore 35:22	13:2,5	44:25 45:2,14,15
having 17:1 33:6	I'll 5:8 58:25	26:5,13,15 31:21,23 34:20	interfering
head 42:11 49:12	I'm 3:16 6:9	36:11	18:25 42:21
heading 11:13,18	11:7 17:21	38:14,22,25 39:5 45:18	44:18,21
12:10 53:15 57:23	18:19 19:8 21:7	46:10,16,18	International
	26:8 36:1,9,13	-	

			rage 6 OL 14
4:5 55:17	54:14	law 1:10 2:6	57:12
<pre>interrupt 30:18 34:10</pre>	IV 2:4	3:15 5:10,16 7:12	little 24:7 26:3 58:8
interrupted 21:2		10:12,16,20 14:16 15:7,15	long 12:8 18:21
intertwined 39:3	January 48:2,3	17:15 20:20	34:23 35:6
invade 18:4	51:9	23:18 50:20	37:24 39:7
	Jeremy 2:4 3:8	51:7 55:20	47:24 58:11
invades 18:13	John 2:4 3:7	lawful 14:17	longer 58:10
invasion 18:18 22:9	join 33:8	lawfully 10:14 15:14	<pre>long-serving 55:1</pre>
inverse 3:25	joining 33:5	lawsuit 27:14	long-standing
5:7,11,15	Judge 25:12 36:5	54:16	4:20
17:18,22 18:1,17,22	42:12 54:19	lead 45:9	lose 29:5
19:16 20:23	judgment 27:4	leading 42:18	loss 26:4
21:9,10,14,19	judicial 1:2	least 52:19	lost 24:21 27:3
22:8,13 30:22 37:7 41:23 42:3	23:25 25:4	leave 44:8	53:20,24
investigation	junction 16:11	leave 44:0	lot 3:13 47:17
48:14	justify 4:8		low 19:2 20:11
involved 24:3		leaving 40:19 47:6	21:18
involves 15:25	KAPLAN 2:14	legal 4:25 6:17	
27:8	key 20:8	12:15 14:11	malicious 37:3
involving 24:8	kinds 33:3 36:11	legislative	38:19
ironed 56:22		23:23 24:12,25 25:3 53:13	manage 13:11
isn't 12:19	Kirk 36:21	length 16:22	managers 13:10
24:10 32:13	KIRSCH 2:14	•	34:11
37:2 50:16,19 54:25	knew 12:14	less 13:7 40:17 51:3	manner 10:15 14:17 15:24
issue 4:24 9:22	L	let's 7:14 42:23	MAR-A-LAGO 1:6
16:8 22:1 31:2 37:19 39:15	L.L.C 1:6	50:2 53:3	
52:25 56:11,12	lack 36:18 41:17	letter 9:22	Mar-A-Largo 2:25 3:24 4:13 8:8
issues 3:17	lacks 26:1	level 19:6 21:25	10:24
11:16 25:15	laid 14:6	34:21	11:15,19,25
31:2 48:25	land 15:4	levels 50:24	12:11,13,24 13:14,17 22:24
56:21 58:6	18:6,25 34:13	liability 1:6	25:18 26:22
it's 3:23 7:11,16 9:5,20	landing 15:3	lighter 51:13	31:18 32:3,23
11:10 12:20	24:8	Likewise 30:22	35:5,9,12,13,23 38:24
16:24	landmark 16:24	limestone 16:25	40:5,8,11,17
17:1,2,8,9,18,2 4 18:9 20:7	language 6:5	20:6	41:9,21
21:12 22:16	7:20 9:1,2,3,4	limitations	43:15,24 45:1,6,20
23:17,19 24:11	12:1 27:21,25 28:18 29:22	53:10	47:4,12 51:25
27:19 28:11,14 32:24	36:9 50:2	<pre>limited 1:6 28:14</pre>	52:12 54:8 56:3
33:1,2,9,11,14	larger 51:17		57:13,16,24
34:23 35:6	last 25:9 48:21	line 32:1 52:11	Marion 2:3,4 3:8
37:13,24 39:4	56:10	link 13:13	34:7,8,10 35:15,17,19,24
41:4,21 42:24 43:2	later 24:20	Lisa 60:7,22	36:4 37:24
45:16,21,22	54:22	listen 45:17	46:6,21,25
46:22 48:25	Lauderdale 2:8	listens 47:17	47:2,8,22,25 48:2,4,11,14
52:23 53:25	39:18 45:12	literally 56:20	, -,,

57:5,7,17 misled 47:16 44:16 46:8 obnoxious Marx 54:19 missed 42:7 50:24 51:7 obviously material 3:14 missing 21:21 noisiest 51:1 41:16,2 matter 5:16 7:12 mitigate 23:22 noisy 51:4 occasion 29:2 50:20 models 51:24 none 4:24 8:10 occur 41:24	y 27:18 3:16
mark 54:19 missed 42:7 52:23 53:13 29:1 38 material 3:14 missing 21:21 noisiest 51:1 41:16,2 matter 5:16 7:12 mitigate 23:22 noisy 51:4 occasion	3:16
material 3:14 missing 21:21 noisiest 51:1 41:16,2 matter 5:16 7:12 mitigate 23:22 noisy 51:4 occasion	
matter 5:16 7:12 mitigate 23:22 noisy 51:4 occasion	
15:6,7,15 25:3 models 51:24 noisy 51:4 occasion	
29:2 50:20 models 51:24 none 4:24 8:10 occur 41:	58:18
	: 6
occurring	gr 32:21
maximum 5:22 moment 34:8 non-Stage 57:22 October 1	1:22
8:18 More 00:13,14 2:23 00	1:19
9:5,6,16,24 moot 51:16 normal 4:12 offense 5	58:14,18
30:4 43:19 Moreover 50:20 10:23 56:1 offer 12:	: 25
morning 25:11,12 north 2:3,12 55:12	
18:23 20:5 36:4 motion 3:19,22 45:9 47:11 Office 2:	:11
40:20 50:25 4:23 11:3 14:4 52:12 56:3	
38:9 48:4,6 57:13,23 OFFICES 2 54:21 55:25	
maybe 17:10 21:9 56:6 notes 60:11 officials	
36:14,15 42:7 move 16:9,13 nothing 8:12 Oftedal 1	1:18
mean 18:9 19:20 23:13,15 12:14 14:19 2:20	
27:7 28:22	5 6:10):6 17:25
33:12,23 moving 22:19 notice 14:2 20:22 2	
35:16,18 municipal 16:2 30:25 4	
36:1,25 37:16 - Motivated Standing 46:12,1	L4 48:13
38:16 39:18 55:11 5 42:22 44:8,20 N nuisance 3:25 59:2	6:9 58:4
45:3 46:21 48:9 N.W 2:15 4:2 10:9,13 older 15:	.00 51.1
53:1,9 57:5 narrow 36:25 13:24 14:5	
58:12	
meaningless 33:6 ones 16:1	
means 60:17 37:7 open-ende	
measure 36:23 36:11 37:14 numerous 13:21	
measured 41:17 navigable 14:8 nutshell 51:19 operate 1	15:0,13
measures 8:20 15:1,14	r 6·18
12:3 2/:21 NCD 50:5 0 10:13 1	
28:1,12 necessarily 38:6 obey 14:12 operation	n 28:21
meet 46:3 obeying 14:16 39:15 4	
memo 33:23 21:18 36:23 objected operation	ns 26:11
memorialized 37:13 11:12,13 operative	e 9:4
nefarious 13:15 obligated 9:14 onerator	47:18
neighborhood obligation 6:17	
mentioned 41:11 46:9 7:8 8:14 24:25	
net 37.8 29:11 35:1,3 opposed 5	53:17
method 44:14	30:7
million 4:6 newer 51:24 51:21 41:13 5	
mind 17:24 50:3 noise 4:5 11:11 obligations opposition	on 24:9
minimize 4:5 17:6 21:1 23:22 7:4,5 8:10,25 9:7,11,13 28:20 options 2	24:18
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	4 4 . 0
24:6,11 32:9 9:7,11,13 28:20 operand 2	4 4:8
minimizing 44:15 35:2 29:24 40:2 order 3:4 minimum 36:5 39:15,17,19 49:19 51:23 13:23 2	

			rage 10 OI 14
53:6 58:20	57:20	period 58:11	39:12
orders 11:16,17	particular	permissible	40:11,16,17,22,
58:22	16:1,24 17:3,9	40:14	25 41:8 43:23 44:25 45:9,20
ordinances 24:19	particularly	personal 4:13	planning 44:18
ordinary 10:14	17:15	Petrick 2:12	play 42:22
others 17:17	parties 6:13 9:8 15:19 23:3	3:2,11 55:12	plead 18:7 22:9
ought 55:7	32:18 60:13,14	pets 21:2	pleading 13:20
ours 41:19,20	party 27:9,16	phase 47:22	14:1 38:8 48:7
ouster 18:3,7,11	29:10 32:25 33:8	phased 51:8,10,14	56:7
outline 9:21	passed 51:7	55:19	pleadings 4:2 5 14:2 18:10
11:5	passed 31:7	phone 44:3,6	19:24 48:5 56:8
outrageous 4:9	47:2,22 48:7	phonetic 15:20	pleads 3:24
overarching 38:21	path 11:18 12:9	<pre>piece 16:1 17:2</pre>	please 3:6
overflew	23:11	pieces 17:4	pled 22:18 36:5
12:13,23	patterns	pilot 14:14	plot 13:15
overflights 21:1	26:12,25	pilots 14:12,15	point 12:8 15:17
22:11	PBIA 6:18 11:22 12:10 13:12	Pilsk 2:14	22:15 23:12
overflown 13:17	50:5 52:10 56:2	3:10,20 6:10	32:17 40:9 48:18 49:2
overflying 13:14	Pelly 1:11 4:16	7:3,15 8:10,23 9:3 10:7	51:6,16 52:5,18
overturned 21:13	5:10,16,20 6:1 7:1,5,6,10	17:3,21,25	55:5,18
owner 16:10,14,16	25:25	18:23 19:19 20:3,16,24	points 8:15 16:15
10:10,14,10	26:13,19,24	21:7,20	policy 24:7,21
	27:6,8,17,20 28:3,4,6,7,9,10	22:3,7,20 25:10 48:22	political 1:10
P.A 2:3	,11,17,19,24	49:1,21,23	23:23
page 11:7 15:20	29:2,5,9,10 30:20,22	50:2,13,17,22	pollution 17:8
52:15 55:15,21 58:1	31:3,17,20	52:4,15,18 53:4 57:19 58:1,22	position 6:12,14
	32:22 33:2,5,19,24	plain 5:25 7:20	8:6 12:6 17:2 18:20 32:20
pages 9:18 60:10 Palm 1:3,10	34:19	plaintiff 1:8	18:20 32:20 38:16 51:19
2:5,13,20,22	35:4,13,22 40:1	2:2 3:23 4:3,8	52:3
3:1 4:4 21:6,12	41:5,14 42:20,23 43:16	8:15 16:9,22 23:7,9,13,14	possible 6:20
23:16 36:19 39:24 51:17	44:3,17	24:20,24	possibly 54:4
55:17 60:5	45:1,15,18 46:1,7,19 47:16	plaintiffs 5:11	55:8
pans 44:13 45:21	49:4,10,17	12:22 24:1 49:3 55:16	
papers 15:10	Pelly's 3:21	plaintiff's	pounds 51:9
24:2	25:19 39:14	######################################	power 5:13 10:3 26:6
paragraph 5:24 6:6,11,19 8:24	people 13:7,11	19:3,8 20:12	powers 23:19
9:4,19 27:7	25:19 26:16,19 32:11 34:5	21:1 53:2	25:6
29:11 41:11	35:7,18,19	Plaintiffs 3:7 10:20 12:25	practices 12:15
48:17,18 49:19 51:20 52:1	37:22 42:14,17,23	15:8	preempted 22:24
55:16,22,23	43:2 45:17	planes 24:4	23:18 39:17
56:14,15,16	people's 47:19	25:20 26:21 31:15,17	preexisted 53:6
Paragraphs 9:10	per 16:3	32:4,23 33:25	prefer 43:14
Pardon 40:6	perhaps 43:14	34:1 35:23	preferred 5:23
parenthesis		37:18,23 38:23	8:18,21

			rage II OI 14
11:20,23 12:4	prohibit 8:10	39:9,16 41:3	reflect 56:8
27:23 28:2 52:7,8 57:9,10	41:8	44:9 55:13,14	reflected 52:24
prejudice 5:18	<pre>prohibited 6:3 43:9 44:17</pre>	questions 25:8	regard 9:1 33:15
		quoted 12:1	51:19,21
present 49:13	prohibition 40:4,7	quotes 8:23	56:18,19
presentation 25:8	prohibits 8:13		regarding 6:3 8:14 16:25
pretty 3:16	promise 30:3	<u>R</u> raised 54:16	56:12
18:10	48:15		regulations 35:2
prevent 48:11	prong 18:12,24	rated 50:25	46:7
prevents 19:10	22:12	rather 19:24 49:12	relate 50:24
48:9	prongs 22:13	reach 32:17	relates 22:15
previous 9:18	proof 33:15	reading 3:14	51:24
principal 4:14	properly 15:14	19:8 27:25	relationship 26:25 39:1
principle 49:14	properties	29:10 52:14	relative
prior 27:14	17:5,11 37:10	real 10:10,12	60:12,14
prism 25:14	<pre>property 4:6 10:18</pre>	12:25 29:24 56:23	release 7:7
private 20:19	16:1,3,10,14,16	really 15:18,23	released 27:13
23:7 24:22	,24 17:2,4,9,10	19:20 20:8	relief 4:8
problem 17:14	18:4 19:3,15 20:4,8,12 22:11	21:23 22:19,20	22:16,17 23:5
42:11,25 43:3 45:21	31:10,11,12	23:6,12,20 24:1,7,11 26:17	25:5 42:8 43:7,8,11
problems 23:22	34:1 41:18	41:7 43:5 49:3	44:2,11 45:22
procedure 7:18	proprietor	51:4,14 54:7 56:14	49:8,15 54:9
9:21 12:13 32:2	34:19,25	reargue 24:21	rely 15:25
40:18 42:21 52:18,20,21	prove 27:3 31:3 32:1 35:25 36:8	53:19	remedy 4:1 16:7
53:15 55:24	37:20,21 38:4,7	reason 15:13	23:7 25:4 36:20 41:8,11
56:2	42:5,19 45:16	27:12 32:21	44:19,20 46:1
procedures	provide 6:19	40:24 43:14 47:9,13,14 54:8	REMEMBERED 2:18
4:4,12,20,21 6:15,16,21 7:19	<pre>proving 35:8 36:7</pre>	reasoning 58:9	repeat 3:17
9:12 10:5,23		reasons 22:21	repeatedly 49:4
11:6,10,12,13 12:9 13:11	proximity 11:24 public 3:25	23:20 27:15	report 60:9
14:10 23:1,2,17	11:10	37:23	reporter
29:14 32:9	13:22,23,24	recall 42:7	60:2,7,18
44:22 50:4 52:7 53:14	16:4,18 20:18 24:18 55:2,3	recites 12:6	reporting 6:24
proceed 3:19	purpose 31:4	recommendation 53:12	9:9,23
proceedings 1:17	purposes 11:3	recommendations	reproduction 60:16
2:19 60:9	pursuance 30:3	53:6	requesting 42:9
process 11:10	pursuant 4:20	record 3:5	43:7,11
14:11 24:18,25	14:21	4:17,18 60:10	require 7:21
33:12	pursuit 30:2	redesign 4:4	9:15 44:2,5
processes 44:18	puts 11:6	refers 11:16	required 6:1 14:12 18:17
Professional		57:19	14:12 18:17 38:11
program 11:11	Q	re-fighting 53:23	requirement
52:23	question 27:6		18:15 21:21
progresses 34:4	28:8,9 31:19 33:16 37:9 38:3	refiled 54:20	36:15
	1		

		·	Tuge II of II
requirements	Room 2:21	sends 31:15	Sir 48:21
6:25 9:9 18:22 19:16 46:4	roughly 50:24	sense 23:6 49:11	situation 26:19
requires 7:21	routes 56:3	sent 32:4 39:25	32:15 41:19 45:23
requisite 38:10	rule 16:5	40:25	situations 45:7
residences	run 35:4	separate 19:12 22:18	skies 53:24
24:14,24	running 39:10	separation 23:19	sleep 21:2
residents 23:9	runs 39:1	25:5	slightly 5:6
residue 19:9	runway 11:13,18 12:10 34:17,22	series 9:22	51:3
resolve 4:24	52:10,11 53:14	serious 55:1	smoking 33:21
respect 15:17	runways 57:22	served 40:21	solely 6:17
respond 27:11		sets 9:7	solo 20:9
response 8:16 18:14 49:11	S	settled 54:16	somehow 13:2,3 44:9
56:6	safe 34:15,17,23 35:6 37:25	settlement 5:25 6:11 7:2,3	someone 10:17
responses 5:6,9	46:11,14,20,22	8:9,12,16	somewhat 17:11
responsibilities	safety 12:4	11:1,8 24:16	22:16
13:22 33:20	27:23 39:13	27:8 35:10 52:16 57:8,11	sooner 47:10
responsible	satisfied 18:21 22:2	58:2	soot 20:2 21:3
28:19 49:13	satisfy 19:15	seven 55:21	sorry 8:14 17:21
responsive 56:17 result 40:1 47:5	22:11 36:15	sharing 32:9	20:22 21:7 46:25 52:17
resulted 53:12	save 59:1	shift 24:23	sort 13:23 15:21
results 45:2	scenes 48:15	shorter 58:14	42:9
reverses 42:1	scrutiny 4:25	showed 31:8	sounds 58:22
review 14:4	se 16:3	shows 13:16 33:15 44:14	source 44:7
Richard 1:18	sea 19:6	48:18	south 11:25 45:9
2:20	second 18:12,24	sign 7:7	47:13
ridiculous 4:15	21:23 25:23 48:6 56:11	signatory 7:1,3	sovereignty 14:8
rise 41:23	Secondly 9:7	signature	speak 17:23 34:8 39:6
rises 21:24	seek 22:17 25:4	27:6,12	speaking 50:24
ROCKWELL 2:14	seeking 40:4,7	signed 45:25	special 15:18,23
Rogow 2:6,7	45:4	significant 19:14	16:3,15,23
3:3,7 25:11,12,24	seeks 4:1,3,6	similar 7:16	specific 6:23
26:10,16 27:15	seem 28:17	17:5 23:14,20	7:9,21 9:3,4,7 38:19 39:22
28:4,7,16,19 29:1,7,23	seems 18:9 21:18	54:17	42:17
30:2,19,24	28:12 32:25 33:1 36:1 40:15	similarly 10:16 15:1 17:6 23:19	specifically
31:1,22 32:15 33:7,11 34:3	53:21 56:22	simple 15:13	10:4 29:25
36:17 37:3,12	SELLARS 2:3	simple 13:13	specificity 26:2 36:16,18
38:18 39:1,6 40:6,9,12,18	send 35:22	5:16,18 7:9 8:3	38:10,12
40:6,9,12,18	45:6,9,10,19 46:15	13:24 14:3,18 15:15 22:8	specifics 19:22
44:5,13 48:17	47:10,11,12	23:4,18 24:23	22:10 54:2
56:11,16 57:2	sending 25:19	25:5 28:14,23	<pre>specified 9:10,17</pre>
Rogow's 34:10 role 14:11	26:16,21 31:16 43:15	38:8,13 41:9 49:9 54:14	specifies 6:23
1016 14:11		single 51:25	11:17

			1490 10 01 11
speculative	stopped 47:3	41:25 42:1	55:10,11 56:9
13:13 20:5	stopping 45:1	Suppose 46:19	59:2
speed 3:16	47:20	Supreme 13:19	that's 6:6 10:13 11:13 16:5
spend 15:8	straight 34:23	15:20 36:22	17:14 18:14,21
spoke 45:18	35:5,8 52:13	sure 26:8 34:9	19:17 20:24
spread 15:22	strict 8:21 12:3 27:22 28:2	36:9 43:6 47:23 48:16	21:18 24:8,11
24:5			28:16,22 29:21 30:13 32:6
spreads 40:19	strike 22:19	Surfside 15:25	35:10,19 37:20
staff 13:10	stronger 28:12 41:20	surmise 13:14 54:7	39:20 40:9,24
stage 5:1 29:13			41:2 43:5,13,21 44:15 46:22
48:7 49:23	studies 9:20	surrounding 46:9	44:15 46:22 47:13 48:18
50:4,14,18,21,2	subdivision 1:10	survive 4:25	49:24 52:4 53:2
5 51:3,4,5,8,11,1	Subsequently	14:3 29:8	54:9 55:7
3,15,18,22,24	51:12	susceptible 17:11	themselves 14:24
55:16,19	substance 22:7		24:1 25:1
56:15,19,21	substantial	system 23:8	theories 15:16
57:1,3,4,5,8,19 ,20	18:3,7,11,24		therefore 11:2
•	substantive	T	31:6
stages 50:23	55:22	taking 8:6 14:16 15:2 20:19	Thereupon 59:3
stake 39:11	successful 43:20	24:8,10 47:7,21	they're 7:5
stand 5:16	Suddenly 23:16	48:10 51:16	14:16,21
standard 14:1,2	sufficient 13:25	talk 7:14 19:21	20:9,17 25:17
17:16,25 18:16	14:3 28:23	37:9	32:6 33:10 34:17,18 35:21
20:16	36:12 38:9,15	talked 13:6 15:9	40:16 41:17
standpoint 38:8	sugar 36:19	34:11 35:7,19	44:6 49:16
stands 54:10	suggest 17:4	37:24	53:21 57:14
start 10:9,10	suit 36:21,22	talking 13:20	Third 2:12
25:13,21	54:15,17	25:25 26:16 29:17 30:16	tied 38:20
started 37:16	Suite 2:7,15	41:17 42:16	tip 51:12
starts 6:11	summary 27:4	55:1	today 51:5 56:7
state 1:10 2:22	super-adjacent	talks 11:8,9	58:21
4:18 5:13 15:7	18:5,13,18 19:5	27:17 52:6	tongue 51:13
22:13 31:13 37:6 42:2 60:4	20:10,17 21:21	targeted 25:18	top 42:10
	22:1,9	30:16 31:7 32:3 37:15,17 42:13	track 7:22
stated 14:2 38:2 41:15 46:2	superceded 50:6	-	11:20,23 12:4
statement 13:5	superior 49:12	technical 24:4,10	25:22 52:8,9
	supervisors		tracks 5:23
states 5:13 8:16,19 15:4	13:10	telephone 21:16	6:2,4 8:2,18,22
statute 53:9	support 12:21	television 21:17	9:16 12:7 23:10
	16:4	terms 5:25 26:1	27:23 34:14,16 46:12 47:17
statutes 35:2	29:13,16,18 30:4,12 41:14	28:5 37:5,16 38:19 39:14	57:9,10,20,22
stay 36:24 55:23	43:18 46:1	40:3 42:25	tracts 28:3
stenographic	48:19 49:23,25	test 22:12	46:14
60:11	50:3 51:21 55:9	testimony	traffic 4:11,18
stenographically	supported 30:7	19:23,25	10:22 12:19
		•	13:2,4,9
60:9	supporting 46:2	thank 3:9.12.20	
60:9 step 38:4	supporting 46:2 50:9 56:19	thank 3:9,12,20 6:10 25:10	14:9,12,21,24 23:8,17,21

34:11 47:14 unlawful 14:20 31:6,14,16 35:7 54:4 36:7 37:20 unless 25:8 39:22,24 42:24 transcript 60:10 60:17 43:23 45:16 transport 11:21 unusual 22:17 48:7 53:19 52:10 54:25 55:5 **update** 50:5,6 travestv 36:8 west 2:5,13,22 upheld 42:8 36:19 45:11 trespass 3:25 upon 4:5 8:25 4:2 10:8,9,17 whatever 26:23 32:3 15:1,7,11 24:22 27:15,18 40:19 **usage** 12:15 37:7 42:3 43:14 58:7 **usually** 44:16 tries 24:20 whatsoever 13:13 25:14 **whereas** 11:5,9 trim 54:24 V 52:6,15,24 **vaguer** 54:25 53:4,16 58:1 **Tripodi** 60:7,22 55:4 whether 34:14 troubled 38:13 **value** 18:21 36:12 true 28:22 31:6 19:14 31:11 38:3,7,13,14 49:7 56:18 46:11 52:25 various 15:9 60:10 whichever 45:9 **varying** 11:23 Trump 4:14 8:20 whispered 54:6 11:12 12:2 vehemently 4:17 28:1,11,15 whispering 54:5 **versus** 21:5,12 53:16 41:24 whole 9:22 13:10 Trump's 34:1 51:16 vibrations 17:6 **try** 5:3 10:20 19:11 41:1 wide 15:22 39:19 48:22 view 40:13 44:14 wind 11:20 trying 15:8 12:11,19 13:18 violation 8:8 31:15 48:7 45:8 35:10 40:1,2 53:19 45:14 52:1 windows 19:12 turn 45:24 virtue 25:18 wish 8:20 12:2 turning 10:7 32:3 28:1,11 14:5 **vis-a-vie** 28:20 wit 2:23 turns 49:11 voluntarily withstand 38:9 54:21 won 53:20,23 IJ **vs** 1:9 wondering 44:11 ultimate 33:13 37:19 work 9:20 W underscores works 28:24 39:9 Washington 2:15 16:14 42:24 wasn't 20:21 understand write 58:7 52:22 53:17 18:8,19 22:16 written 3:18 26:4,8 33:13 watching 21:17 38:7 55:7 56:13 wrong 16:5 18:20 weather 11:21 undertake 6:24 12:12,19 13:18 undue 4:10 weeks 58:12 **yards** 19:10 10:11,21 12:20 weight 50:25 13:2 26:5 Young 21:5,12 we'll 4:17 43:2 31:21,23 36:11 22:2 37:9 42:1 58:25 37:1 38:14 we're 2:25 3:21 unique 17:1 25:25 26:17,23 United 15:4 27:2 29:17 30:16